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ABSTRACT
The school of thought articulated by critical theorists Giorgio Agamben and Joan
Copjec differ from each other in methodology, approach, and language. Yet, both
Agamben and Copjec each write to reject positivist notions of ethics, which each theorist
identifies as rooted in the same ideological apparatuses that propagate exclusionary and
violent actions. By turning away from pre-given ethics and ideology, these writers
attempt to delineate why these philosophies have been the vehicle of violence and racial
oppression, and reiterate the importance of turning away from such thought in order for
the subject to conceptualize a new way of being and relating to others that combats
dominant ideology. Agamben’s theoretical concept of homo sacer that lies at the center
of his philosophical project, and Copjec’s Lacanian understanding of the subject as
inherently ruptured, both delineate subjectivity, as well as the concepts of race and racism
in novel ways. Using these theorists to read Morrison’s novels illustrates the critical
concepts outlined by these two thinkers.
In the first chapter of this thesis, I plan to outline Agamben’s notion of homo
sacer, and Copjec’s theorizing of the subject as inherently ruptured. I employ Morrison’s
piece of literary criticism, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination,
to demonstrate how Morrison’s literary and intellectual project as a writer also aims to
refigure subjectivity, illustrating and expanding upon Agamben and Copjec’s work. In
the second chapter, I will move on to discuss Agamben’s political philosophy and
concept of homo sacer, analyzing Morrison’s novels, A Mercy, and Home to demonstrate
how her work illustrates and expands upon Agamben’s analysis of biopolitics. Lastly, in
the third chapter of this thesis, I place Morrison in dialogue with Copjec, demonstrating
how Morrison’s characters illustrate the notion of a ruptured subject, and why it is
important to read her work through this lens. I aim to demonstrate how Morrison’s
characters expand upon the notions of race, femininity, and subjectivity as conceived by
Copjec. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to delineate why it is beneficial to place these
three writers in dialogue with one another to analyze notions of racial identity,
subjectivity, violence, and trauma.
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INTRODUCTION
The school of thought articulated by critical theorists Giorgio Agamben and Joan
Copjec differ from each other in methodology, approach, and language. Yet, both
Agamben and Copjec each write to reject positivist notions of ethics, which each theorist
identifies as rooted in the same ideological apparatuses that propagate exclusionary and
violent actions. They each argue in different ways that ideology produces or perpetuates
an oppressive social structure that induces subjects into identifying their interests within
that system. Instead, both Agamben and Copjec propose a new way of conceiving
subjectivity, ethics, and collectivity. By turning away from pre-given ethics and ideology,
these writers attempt to delineate why such philosophies have been the vehicle of
violence and racial oppression, and reiterate the importance of turning away from such
thought in order for the subject to conceptualize a new way of being and relating to others
that combats dominant ideology. Agamben’s theoretical concept of homo sacer that lies
at the center of his philosophical project, and Copjec’s Lacanian understanding of the
subject as inherently ruptured, both delineate subjectivity, as well as the concepts of race
and racism in novel ways.
Using these theorists to read Morrison’s novels illustrates the critical concepts
outlined by these two thinkers, and may also function to expand upon them, as her work
depicts a new way of being, or a black subjectivity. Scholars have analyzed Toni
Morrison’s work through a number of theoretical lenses, including feminism,
psychoanalysis, and critical race theory. The central concepts of history, slavery, trauma,
and racism in Morrison’s novels have been explicated in each of these theoretical
1

frameworks. My aim for this thesis, is to demonstrate how Morrison’s literary project
portrays black femininity and subjectivity in a novel way, and why the study of her work
benefits from the theoretical concepts of subjectivity laid out by Agamben and Copjec. I
also plan to demonstrate how Agamben and Copjec’s particular concepts of subjectivity
become illuminated and enhanced through Morrison’s novels and characters.
Central to Agamben’s work is the concept of homo sacer, a figure within the state
structure that is stripped of political status and represents what Agamben defines as “bare
life,” life that can be killed with impunity. For Agamben, the production of bare life as
such is necessitated by the state. Morrison’s novels reflect this figure, as the African
American characters are portrayed as what Agamben defines as homo sacer. Homo sacer
is a figure that is submitted to the law, but is not protected by it. For Agamben, homo
sacer represents an individual who is made to be reduced to “bare life” or biological life
alone, a figure denied political and symbolic signification. Agamben writes that homo
sacer is the “originary exception in which human life is included in the political order in
being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed.”1 In Morrison’s novels, she often
represents black characters as homo sacer figures. They are included in the social sphere,
are submitted to following the law, yet receive no protection from it. They are always at
the risk of violence, and when it is committed against them, these characters are often
aware that they cannot seek justice or help from the political or social institutions that
perpetuate this sort of violence, and that do not value them as complete, human subjects.
In A Mercy, Morrison explores the colonial beginnings of America, and the slave trade.
One of the story’s narrators, a slave girl named Florens, is depicted as a homo sacer
1

Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Heller-Roazen, Daniel, (Stanford UP, 1998), 85.
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figure. In this novel, Morrison illuminates the formation of the slave laws in colonial
America as laws that reduce the slaves to what Agamben defines as “bare life”. Morrison
writes throughout the novel that the white colonists were in the business of “authorizing
chaos in defense of order,” and “separated and protected all whites from all others
forever,” as black slaves can be killed, raped, or punished without reason, however their
owners see fit.2 The omniscient narrator continues explaining that the slave laws were
thought to be for the good of the white colonists, “laws encouraging cruelty in exchange
for common cause, if not common virtue.”3 This represents Agamben’s notion that the
production of homo sacer, or bare life as such, is necessitated by the state to protect and
support the individuals that hold political or social status—the chosen population that
must be separated and protected. And it is this separation that defines the subjectivity of
those within the protection of law and society. Agamben writes that “exteriority—the law
of nature and the principle of the preservation of one’s own life—is truly the innermost
center of the political system.”4 Morrison’s novels depict this concept, as the construction
of black characters as homo sacer or bare life, directly correlates to the subjectivity of the
white characters and communities in each work.
Copjec’s concept of subjectivity focuses on the inherent rupture at the core of the
subject, working within the Lacanian notions of fantasy, desire, and drive. While many
scholars have applied Lacanian psychoanalysis to Morrison’s work, Copjec’s focus on
the subject’s rupturing, in terms of conceiving racial and feminine identity, are
particularly useful to exploring how Morrison constructs the notion of subjectivity in her
2
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work. Copjec relates that at the heart of the subject’s formation is a traumatic rupturing
and inherent sense of lack, and the ethical act as well is defined as a self-rupturing choice.
For Lacan, the subject’s entire construction of reality, built upon layers of fantasy, is
inherently linked to this sense of lack, and what he defines as the Law of Desire that calls
one to search and obtain the missing kernel of the self, which is a futile mission. This
kernel refers to the sense of loss or lack that predicates our being, and is inherent and
indissoluble in us. We as subjects must “wake up” from this fantasy of reality to
understand the forces that cause each of us to act in accordance of our desire, and
rationalizes the anti-ethical acts we perform in this pursuit. In Imagine There is No
Woman, Joan Copjec explicates Lacan’s reading of the character Antigone, whom
through the act of breaking the law and burying the body of her dead brother, becomes an
ethical subject. Copjec explains that it is Antigone’s act of love for her brother that allows
her to rise above the level of her function, and to proclaim her own decision and law
separate from any other law, ideology, or notion of personal interest. Copjec explains that
Antigone proves herself to be “autonomous,” as she “gives herself her own law and does
not seek validation from any other authority.”5 Through this act of love for her brother,
Antigone is able to break away from the fantasmatic realm of subjectivity and reality,
rising above her own historical contingency, and risks everything—her biological life,
but most importantly, her symbolic death and loss of signification in the societal realm.
During this act, not only does Antigone separate herself from her own historical and
social identity and position, she also exposes the void of the real that predicates the
symbolic structure. In Morrison’s Beloved, the protagonist, Sethe, undergoes a similar
5
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process, when in the moment of an unexpected event, she makes a decision that is selfrupturing, and establishes her own law, and becomes autonomous in that moment. When
presented with the possibility of having her children taken back to a life of slavery that
she escaped, Sethe kills her baby, acting out of love as a mother, protecting her child
from the traumatic life of slavery that would have reduced her to a farm tool or animal for
the plantation owner’s use. Like Antigone, Sethe also follows Lacan’s ethical imperative
by not giving way on her desire, and making a decision where there is no apparent
decision to be made, acting out of love instead of self-interest or preservation. Morrison’s
characters illustrate Copjec’s notion of the Lacanian subject while also demonstrating
new ways of subjectivity, depicting a specifically black subjectivity and struggle.
In the first chapter of this thesis, I plan to outline Agamben’s notion of homo
sacer, and Copjec’s Lacanian subject of lack. I will draw out these two concepts,
showing the connections and contrasts between the two, and how they each conceptualize
the notion of subjectivity in startling ways. I also plan to employ Morrison’s piece of
literary criticism, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, to
demonstrate how Morrison’s literary and intellectual project as a writer also aims to
refigure subjectivity. This chapter will delineate how Agamben and Copjec’s theories
deepen our understanding of Morrison’s work, and how Morrison’s novels help to
expand upon these theories. In Playing in the Dark, Morrison argues that the construction
of white subjectivity in classics of American literature and in the construction of
American history as such, is inherently tied to the unfree, black, slave, or Africanist
presence in these works. Morrison conceptualizes how white subjectivity, and notions of
freedom and “Americanness,” as seen in the tradition of American literature, depends
5

upon having a contrasting image of a people who are not free. By the end of this chapter,
I plan on introducing how Morrison’s work reimagines black subjectivity, and why
staging a dialogue between Morrison, Agamben, and Copjec is beneficial both to the
scholarship of Morrison’s work, and the work of these two theorists.
In the second chapter, I will move on to discuss Agamben’s political philosophy
and concept of homo sacer, selecting two of Morrison’s novels to demonstrate how her
work illustrates and expands upon Agamben’s theoretical project. The focus of this
chapter will be to put Morrison and Agamben’s work in dialogue with each other. I will
analyze Morrison's novels, A Mercy, and Home to accomplish this, outlining the
connection between the black characters of these novels and Agamben’s concept of homo
sacer, racism, and violence. The subjectivities of the oppressed and oppressors
themselves in Morrison’s work reflects the concept of homo sacer, and provide an
alternate illustration of this concept, apart from Agamben’s use of homo sacer to outline
the construction of the modern nation state. Using the concept of homo sacer to analyze
the construction of black subjectivity and white subjectivity in both A Mercy and Home, I
plan to demonstrate how Morrison’s black characters represent “bare life,” and how the
historical oppression of African Americans illustrated in these novels provide another
way to understand the biopolitical concept central to Agamben’s intellectual project.
Lastly, in the third chapter of this thesis, I will place Morrison in dialogue with
Copjec, demonstrating how Morrison’s characters illustrate the notion of a ruptured
subject, and why it is important to read her work through this lens. I plan to show how
Morrison’s characters expand upon the notions of race, femininity, and subjectivity
outlined by Copjec. To accomplish this, chapter 3 will focus on an analysis of Morrison’s
6

novels, The Bluest Eye, and Beloved, to establish how Morrison’s work explores the way
that subjects either adhere to, or “wake up” from the fantasy reality that is founded upon
racial, gender, and sexual oppressions that are the source of trauma for each protagonist.
Illustrating how the traumatic history of slavery persists as a facet of black consciousness
and reality, and by writing the internal dialogues of each character, Morrison explores the
desires, conscious and unconscious, of the oppressed and the oppressors in each
narrative. At the center of both novels is a concern with personal and collective healing
that must begin with the subject’s reconstitution.
While many scholars have analyzed the themes of race, violence, and subjectivity
in Morrison’s work, Agamben and Copjec’s theoretical frameworks provide a new
avenue of intervention in the current scholarship. The concepts outlined by each
philosopher is reflected and illustrated through Morrison’s literary project, and I argue
that the work of each of these theorists can be better understood or expanded when read
in conjunction with Morrison’s novels. Morrison’s construction of black subjectivity,
black femininity, and her potent illustrations of the rupture or void at the center of race
and racism, challenges the reader’s understanding of these concepts. Her work also
challenges the reader to rethink the history of race and racism in the United States, and
how each individual participates and maintains such oppressive social and political
structures. By reading Morrison, Agamben, and Copjec together, and placing Morrison in
dialogue with these theorists, the novelty and value of how Morrison’s work rethinks
subjectivity and race can be better understood.

7

CHAPTER 1: PLAYING IN THE DARK WITH AGAMBEN AND COPJEC
Introduction
In Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, Morrison argues
that the construction of (white) American identity as illustrated in American literary
classics, and in American cultural history as such, is tied to an unfree, black, slave, or
Africanist presence. Morrison conceptualizes how white subjectivity, with its notions of
freedom and “Americanness,” as seen in the tradition of American literature, depends
upon a contrasting image of a people who are not free. Morrison writes that the
Africanism present in the American literary canon reveals the necessity of such an unfree
presence to the construction of American identity and history, and “provides a way of
contemplating chaos and civilization, desire and fear, and a mechanism for testing the
problems and blessings of freedom”.6 Throughout this study, one can recognize the
concern with race, trauma, language, and history at the center of Morrison’s literary
project. The history of Black America is the history of the United States—not a separate,
independent history---while ideas of freedom and oppression, justice and violence, white
identity and black identity, are inextricably imbedded within one another, woven into the
fabric of American history and society itself. Morrison contemplates these connections as
evident in her analysis of the American literary tradition in “an effort to avert the critical
gaze from the racial object to the racial subject; from the described and imagined to the
describers and the imaginers; from the serving to the served”.7 This effort is manifest in
not only Morrison’s scholarly work, but also in her literary work. Morrison’s literary and
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intellectual projects often function to not only refigure black subjectivity, but notions of
subjectivity itself, and she often explores the conscious and unconscious desires and
perspectives of the oppressors in her fiction. Placing Morrison is dialogue with these two
theorists, looking at Agamben’s concept of homo sacer and Copjec’s psychoanalytic
subject of lack, introduces a new way of linking history, race and violence.
Biopolitics and Playing in the Dark
In Playing in the Dark, Morrison questions the notion that the presence of African
Americans and African American history has not impacted canonical American literature.
Morrison draws attention to the Africanist presence in these works, arguing that
American literature, culture, and history is inherently informed by this presence—an
acknowledgement she finds missing from American literary and historical scholarship.
These observations have caused her to question whether revered qualities of American
literature, such as “individualism, masculinity, social engagement versus historical
isolation; acute and ambiguous moral problematics; the thematics of innocence coupled
with an obsession with figurations of death and hell—are not in fact responses to a dark,
abiding, signing Africanist presence”.8 This Africanist presence is not only explicitly
represented by the figures of slaves and African Americans within a narrative, but also
the symbolic expression of the color black or “darkness” representing fear, death, or evil,
in contrast to symbolic expressions of the color white or “lightness” designating
innocence, purity, or goodness. She argues that any mention of a “darkness” or
“blackness” is not merely a symbolic use of color or aesthetic literary ploy, but that these
expressions of color, and “darkness”—and of white or “lightness”—are inherently
8
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racialized expressions, or racially coded. An explicit example of such metaphorical and
symbolic uses of dark and light color representing good and evil, purity and sin, can be
seen in Nathanial Hawthorne’s short story, “Young Goodman Brown,” when the
protagonists for which the story is named wonders into the woods at night and happens
upon dark bodies and presences, and what appears to be some sort of ceremony of
witchcraft. Notions of “Americanness”, as expressed in American literature and its
scholarship are Eurocentric and often defined by whiteness. Morrison aims to
demonstrate how such notions are self-perpetuating, and depend upon the Africanist or
dark presence found in canonical works of American literature. Morrison states that
during her interrogation of American literary classics, “What became transparent were
the self-evident ways that Americans choose to talk about themselves through and within
a sometimes allegorical, sometimes metaphorical, but always choked representation of an
Africanist presence”.9 Dark or Africanist illustrations in American literature then,
function to express American fears and anxieties, and questions of American identity
itself, in that American-ness is the effect of a chain of significations in which the trope of
binarism—white and black—reifies identities. In other words, one cannot tangibly
represent white without its binary other, black. This means that there is no substance in
the category white and subjectivity built on it. Morrison’s own works of fiction draw
attention to the questions she raises in Playing in the Dark, questions that Clemens Spahr
and Phillip Loffler identify in recent works of American literature by women of color,
which they identify as an effort to critically interrogate the very concept of cultural

9
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Americanness and its machineries of self-perpetuation.10 Morrison’s work explores and
questions the ways that race and the presence of African Americans are imbedded in the
cultural technologies that produce and sustain Eurocentric notions of American identity
and subjectivity.
The contrasting image of an unfree Africanist presence necessary to the
construction of American identity that Morrison recognizes throughout the tradition of
American literature parallels Agamben’s concept of the figure of homo sacer central to
his philosophical work. Agamben situates the production of subjectivity within the
biopolitical structure of the modern nation state. In Homo Sacer, Agamben’s analysis
begins with Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, defined as the intervention of politics into
the production and care of the biological life of individuals within the state, or what
Agamben designates as the “bare life” of individuals. Agamben expands upon Foucault’s
theory of biopolitics to illustrate how totalitarian states, in particular the Nazi regime and
the concentration camp, were conceived and operated. For Agamben, totalitarian regimes
such as that of Nazi Germany illustrate the apexes of biopolitics operating in political
structures that facilitate the total domination of civilization. Agamben’s notion of bare
life is not merely biological life, it is life that can be killed with impunity, such as the
Jews who were represented as bare life in Nazi Germany. Foucault states that
“Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as a problem that is at once
scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem”.11 The life or
health of the citizen, and therefore of the social body as a whole, is the basis for which
10
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the state intercedes into citizens’ bodies, making decisions regarding whether certain
lives are of value or not, and subjecting the body to regulatory processes in an effort to
construct and maintain the life and health of the population, therefore ensuring that
citizens’ bodies function to produce and reproduce for the state. Agamben states that this
process involving “the entry of zoe into the sphere of the polis—the politicization of bare
life as such—constitutes the decisive event of modernity and signals a radical
transformation of the political-philosophical categories of classical thought”.12 The
biological lives of citizens, as they begin to represent the central political concern of the
state, marks the beginning of the political structure of modern democratic nations, and the
construction of the subject within this system. For Agamben, this shift in political
structure in which life is subordinate to it leads to the consideration of the “biopolitical as
the threshold of ‘bare life,’” demarcating this shift as “catastrophic”.13 The property of
sovereign power over the lives of citizens is the power to produce bare life, complicating
the man/citizen dichotomy in the biopolitical apparatus of the modern nation state.
The man/citizen dichotomy that begins to break down in a biopolitical system
defines the modern nation state and subjectivity for Agamben, and is why the figure of
homo sacer becomes central to his argument. Through tracing the history of the figure of
homo sacer from antiquity, Agamben defines this figure as one that can be killed without
it being considered a crime or homicide, and whose death may not serve as a sacrifice14.
This figure is at once abandoned by the law, yet is subjected to the law’s punishment,

12
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representing a situation where the man/citizen distinction becomes difficult to perceive.
Bare life is what represents this threshold between man and citizen. For Agamben,
sovereign power lies in the production of bare life, using the figure of homo sacer to
theorize the political justification of violence, and to demonstrate how modern
biopolitical states necessitate the production of bare life. Homo sacer is a figure that has
been forcibly reduced to bare life. He delineates methodologies of democratic states that
politicize each subject from birth, describing the subject as a virtually passive entity
constructed by and inscribed within the political system. What is most striking about
Agamben’s philosophical inquiry into modern subjectivity is the notion that within a
biopolitical system, a nation state is defined by its population—the people that live within
it, rather than the land it occupies. This radical shift in how the state conceives of its
property, so to speak, is what most concerns Agamben.
Important to Agamben’s delineation of the figure of homo sacer, is the notion that
the production of bare life is not only necessitated by the modern nation state, but the
subjectivity and identity of the population of recognized citizens is defined by the
exclusion of those who are not recognized citizens. Without a population that is stripped
of political status and reduced to a state of bare life, there would be no way to define the
protected and valued citizen. The protected population of the modern nation state is only
able to be defined through the existence of another group that is not “free,” as it were,
and not included in the recognized population of citizens. Exclusion from the political
sphere, this exception to the rule, is what justifies the rule and validates the power of the
state, and the rights of the individuals included within the system. Agamben explains that
the “exception does not subtract itself from the rule,” but rather “the rule, suspending
13

itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first
constitutes itself as the rule”.15 The state is founded upon excluding certain groups or
individuals, and validates its own power through this necessary facet of its structure. This
represents a view of collective identification and subjective identification as being
inherently rooted in the separation and restraint, or destruction, of the other.16 Agamben
relates this political understanding to the historical phenomena of the Third Reich and the
concentration camps meant to separate the Jews from the rest of the population.
Agamben references the foundation for this line of political thinking as “Exteriority—the
law of nature and the principle of the preservation of one’s own life,” as being “truly the
innermost center of the political system”17. Protecting the social body from an outside
threat is seen to be a central motivation of the Nazi regime and their extreme efforts to
exterminate the Jews, as they considered Jews a threat to the wellbeing of European
civilization. The identification of the people relies on separation from a foreign or
threatening other. Agamben reiterates that the “The separation of the Jewish body is the
immediate production of the specifically German body, just as its production is the
application of the rule”.18 The social body is then produced through the process of
separation from and the destruction of a threatening other, and relies on this process to
define and protect the identity of the nation state and its citizens.
Similarly, the separation of the black body from the white population through
enslavement in early America functioned to produce the (white) American body. In much

15

Ibid., 18.
Pamela M. Lee, "My Enemy/My Friend." Grey Room, no. 24 (2006), 104.
17
Ibid., 36.
18
Ibid., 174.
16

14

the same manner that Agamben identifies the process of separation and exclusion at the
heart of state violence and the mission of the Third Reich and concentration camps, the
enslaved Africanist presence Morrison recounts in the American literary canon illustrates
this same process of separation and exclusion at the root of American history and
identity. Morrison is clear that this process of exclusion was foundational to the
formation of the young United States in an era when the country forged its character and
established its power. She is, however, critical of the notion that such political motives
and the racism employed in its pursuit is an intrinsic or inevitable occurrence—it is a
consciously motivated and self-preserving project to be sure—but it is not organic. She
clarifies that “Among Europeans and the Europeanized, this shared process of
exclusion—of assigning designation and value—has led to the popular and academic
notion that racism is a ‘natural,’ if irritating phenomenon”.19 Morrison’s definition of the
Africanist, unfree figures present in American literature, and the formation of (white)
American identity against this presence, reflects Agamben’s political understanding that
the collective effort to define an identity against another separated group is inherently
linked to the political establishment of liberal and free subjects.20 Morrison notes how
white writers in the American literary canon seem to write the enslaved Africanist
presence into their stories without racial consciousness, and it is this lack of racial
consciousness in American literary criticism that Morrison takes to task in Playing in the
Dark. Just as Agamben claims that it is homo sacer and the production of bare life that
democratic state structures necessitate, Morrison claims that the enslaved black body was

19
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essential for the formation of the democratic American state and its “free” citizens. The
enslaved Africanist presence in American literature is representative of bare life, or a
homo sacer figure through which American identity has been constructed.
Agamben employs the figure of homo sacer throughout his philosophical project
as a manner of analyzing notions of state power and the value or nonvalue of human
individuals within the modern nation state, in order to better define or understand notions
of modern subjectivity. The figure of homo sacer provides a contrasting image for
politically recognized and protected individuals to be defined against, and an avenue to
express concepts of oppression and enslavement, inclusion and exclusion. Morrison
argues that within American literature and history, the black body represents the conduit
through which such notions are explored and questioned. She writes that “The slave
population, it could be and was assumed, offered itself up as surrogate selves for
meditation on problems of human freedom, its lure and its elusiveness”.21 The black body
was visually marked by difference by white men in the New World, which provided an
avenue for whites to assign and contain their own anxieties of freedom and oppression,
civility and primal desire confronted in the untamed space of the young United States.
Morrison argues “It was this Africanism, deployed as rawness and savagery, that
provided the staging ground and arena for the elaboration of the quintessential American
identity”.22 In essence, Morrison recognizes the excluded, yet ever present Africanist
presence in American literature as the very expression of American consciousness. This
concept reflects Agamben’s claim that “The outside is not another space that resides
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beyond a determinate space, but rather, it is the passage, the exteriority that gives it
access—in a word, it is its face, its eidos”.23 The black body and Africanism expressed in
the American literary canon is then not a contrasting image against which (white)
American identity is formed, but Morrison rather arrives at the notion that this
Africanism presence is itself an expression of American identity and consciousness.
Morrison emphasizes that this slave population “is convenient in every way, not the least
of which is self-definition,” as in the early United States, the “new white male can now
persuade himself that savagery is ‘out there’”.24 White men exorcized their own anxieties,
fears, and internal struggles for freedom to the enslaved black body as homo sacer, to
validate their dominance at the expense of others’ oppression. The ego-reinforcing
project of exclusion and separation enacted by white men through slavery is a concept
explicated by both Morrison and Agamben.
Morrison identifies white men’s effort to define, separate, and contain the black
body as the foundation of American identity and democratic state structure. In parallel to
this notion, Agamben claims that it is the power to forcibly reduce life to bare life as
such, or homo sacer, that defines state power or sovereign power. Agamben states that
homo sacer represents the “originary exclusion through which the political dimension
was first constituted,” defining the “production of bare life” as the “originary activity of
sovereignty”.25 It is the ability, or the power to enslave, to define the value or nonvalue of
life, to reduce an individual or a group of people to a state of bare life without political
status, that is the foundation of sovereign power. Morrison also identifies the power to
23
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exclude and enslave as the founding force that built the liberal, independent US American
state. The slave-master relationship is at the root of not only the American literary
tradition, but American history. The need to establish difference in order to establish an
American identity is reflected in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “The American Scholar,” in
which he outlines the deliberate project of the construction of a free, American man that
stands above others.26 At the end of this speech, he claims, “A nation of men will for the
first time exist, because each believes himself inspired by the Divine Soul which also
inspires all men,” at once acknowledging the conscious construction of this land of men,
and claiming the right to dominance above others through the “Divine Soul” that grants
it.27 In a biopolitical apparatus in which the state itself is defined by its population, by
the people instead of the land it occupies, the relationship of the enslaved to the slave
owner is at the root of such a system. Agamben emphasizes that “what seems so
scandalous to us moderns—namely, property rights over persons, could in fact be the
originary form of property, the capture (the ex-ceptio) of the use of bodies in the juridical
order”.28 Just as Agamben defines the ownership of bodies as perhaps the original form
of property ownership, to capture and produce bare life, so too does Morrison
demonstrate how the slave/master relationship is not only symbolic, but foundational to
the concept of the United States and to its construction.
Playing in the Dark and the Lacanian Subject of Lack
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In Playing in the Dark, Morrison is not only explicating systems of exploitation
and racial oppression at the center of United States history, she is also exploring the
underlying psychical constructions of (white) American identity as illustrated in
American literature. It is due to Morrison’s critical exploration of white and black
subjectivity throughout her writing, both fiction and nonfiction, that much of her work
has been critiqued from a Lacanian lens. She herself recognizes the usefulness of
psychoanalysis to interrogate notions of national and racial identity. In the preface to
Playing in the Dark, Morrison states that “The narrative into which life seems to cast
itself surfaces most forcefully in certain kinds of psychoanalysis”.29 Morrison’s concern
with language and how it is racially encoded, along with the kinds of “unconscious”
desires and perceptions that the use of language reveals, does lend her work to a Lacanian
lens of analysis. It is for this reason that Joan Copjec’s specific Lacanian lens may be
most useful in exploring Morrison’s writing, and Morrison’s writing may also be a useful
companion to Copjec’s theoretical work, providing potent illustrations for Copjec’s
analyses of the ruptured subject, racial identity, and Lacanian ethics. Copjec’s work
operates from “the belief that psychoanalysis is the mother tongue of our modernity and
that the important issues of our time are scarcely articulable outside the concepts it has
forged,” a belief that parallels Morrison’s own claims of the relevance of psychoanalysis
quoted above.30 Employing a Lacanian lens to explore the psychological underpinnings
of American (white) identity and racial oppression at the center of US history that
Morrison delineates in Playing in the Dark, will function to illuminate these concepts.
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Copjec’s concept of subjectivity focuses on the inherent rupture at the core of the
subject, working within the Lacanian notions of fantasy, desire, and drive. The Lacanian
subject comes into being through the traumatic event of entering the world of language in
the symbolic order, which leaves the subject with an inherent sense of lack. Copjec’s
intellectual project deals with Lacanian ethics, outlining why it is that we perform antiethical acts in an attempt to fulfill desires to gain a sense of wholeness. For Lacan, the
subject’s entire construction of reality, built upon layers of fantasy, is inherently linked to
this sense of lack, and what he defines as the Law of Desire that calls one to search and
obtain the missing kernel of the self, which is a futile mission. This kernel refers to the
sense of loss or lack that predicates our being, and is inherent and indissoluble in us. We
as subjects must “wake up” from this fantasy of reality to understand the forces that cause
each of us to act in accordance of our desire, and rationalizes the anti-ethical acts we
perform in this pursuit. Copjec explains that the rupture or cut that predicates being
“carves up the body image and thus drives the subject to seek its being beyond that which
its image presents to it; it causes the subject to always find in its image something
lacking”.31 This sense of lack causes the subject to search for something external to it as
an attempt to return to a primordial sense of wholeness experienced before entering the
symbolic order. Copjec reiterates that “The subject constructed by language finds itself
detached from a part of itself. And it is this primary detachment that renders fruitless all
the subject’s efforts for a reunion with its complete being”.32 This perception of the
subject parallels Morrison’s explanation of the construction of white subjectivity and
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American identity in Playing in the Dark, as white subjectivity itself is founded on this
sense of lack. To ameliorate the sense of this lack, white subjects need its other,
blackness.
Copjec’s explanation of the Lacanian subject also functions to delineate what the
concept of race provides for the subject, granting an avenue for a perceived sense of
wholeness and collectivity, though race itself is predicated by an essential rupture or
void. Morrison explains that any study of race and racism should also focus on “the
impact of racism on those who perpetrate it,” continuing to note that “It seems both
poignant and striking how avoided and unanalyzed is the effect of racist inflection on the
subject”.33 Morrison’s argument for the construction of white subjectivity and American
identity as evidenced by her critique of American literary classics, is an attempt to begin
to explore this important question that is necessary to understand why race and racism are
avenues through which the subject strives to achieve a sense of completeness, though
Lacan tells us that this can never be achieved. Race is a fantasy reality of identity that a
subject can cling to as an attempt to alleviate this sense of lack, and racism as well stems
from this fantasy. Following Lacan’s lead, Copjec explains what it is, exactly, that the
subject stands to “gain” from the concept of race, and racism: an “escape” from mortality.
She writes that “modern man, refusing to accept the finitude that modern thought thrust
upon him, doubles himself through a notion of race that allows him to survive his own
death”. 34 The concept of race in early America granted white men an attempt to satisfy
desires for wholeness, to cling to fantasy and not face the real of their existence as
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incomplete, mortal beings. Working with the Lacanian concept of jouissance—a
traumatic experience of excess pleasure—Sheldon George explains that the history of
American slavery “has produced both race and racism as modes of jouissance, as
methods of accessing being”.35 This understanding of race and why one partakes in acts
of racism provides a point of reference for Morrison’s study of (white) American identity
and how she sees this illustrated in American literature.
Morrison reiterates the notion that the enslavement of African Americans served
as the basis for the construction of (white) American identity, interrogating the
underlying motives or psychic reasoning of the oppressor. Morrison explains that the
Africanism she sees in works of American literature, which emerged “under the pressures
of ideological and imperialistic rationales for subjugation,” is “thoroughly serviceable,
companionably ego-reinforcing, and pervasive”.36 Owning slaves, or at least having the
image of an unfree people against which a white man can forge his own identity is “egoreinforcing,” sustaining what Lacan would claim is the subject’s fantastical sense of
wholeness, freedom, and in this case, superiority in racial hierarchy. In this sense, the
ego-reinforcing practice of slavery and distanced Africanism illustrated in American
literature, is inherent to and indicative of the construction of a collective (white)
American identity, and to the notion of American exceptionalism. This parallels Copjec’s
claim that “Singularity itself, that which appears most to disperse society, is here posited
as essential rather than antagonistic to a certain modern social bond”.37 In this way, we
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can begin to understand the concept of race as a method of subjective validation and a
sense of collective belonging, both invented and sustained by white men in need of an
avenue of subjective and collective identification. Analyzing the formation of (white)
American identity through a psychoanalytic lens reflects Agamben’s notion of
citizenship, homo sacer, and the exclusionary principle that is the foundation of a
biopolitical state structure. The separation of valued citizens from bare life, the
demarcation of those two categories, resonates with Copjec’s Lacanian subject of lack
and notions of race, in which race becomes a threshold of division in a biopolitical
structure. It also functions to illustrate the difference between Agamben’s intellectual
project and that of Copjec who works from a Lacanian framework---rather than focus on
the structure of a biopolitical system, psychoanalysis provides the tools necessary to
delineate the psychic processes that are the reason for the subject’s participation and
identification within such a system, in which the lacking subject adheres to this system in
an attempt to gain a sense of wholeness and identity.
In Playing in the Dark, Morrison relates that the reasons why immigrants fled to
the “New World” is often understood to be due to a strong compulsion to search for a
new existence, or a clean slate. This is important to understanding why it is that racial
hierarchy and slavery flourished in a space where many sought independence, liberation,
and opportunity. It is also important to understanding the Africanism that Morrison finds
in American literature. For most of these immigrants, the “Old World” meant “poverty,
prison, social ostracism, and, not infrequently, death.”38 Fleeing to the “New World”
meant a chance to recreate oneself and one’s circumstance, in a place free from the Old
38
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World’s oppressive history. Morrison explains that “One could be released from a useless
binding, repulsive past into a kind of history-lessness, a blank page waiting to be
inscribed”.39 Copjec defines the attempt to begin with a blank page, so to speak, as an
effort to escape what Lacan defines as the traumatic Real that cannot be defined through
language, and represents that rupture or void at the center of the subject’s being. Using
modernism as an example, Copjec explains this attempt to escape the real and history as
such as a “negative gesture” or “erasure.”40 Though as both Copjec via Lacan and
Morrison remind us, history is not escapable, and often repeats itself or returns in
startling, or unsettling ways. Copjec reiterates that “There is no arguing with the real, no
negating it, since history itself depends on it. It is precisely because it cannot be negated
that we say it eternally returns or repeats”. 41The sense of anxiety, oppression, and lack of
freedom that was the impetus for fleeing to the New World could not have merely
vanished, but persisted. The practice of slavery and roots of America racism, as well as
the Africanism that Morrison identifies in American fiction, can be understood as a
repetition of the history that those who fled to the New World tried to escape. Morrison’s
own works of fiction explore this notion of history, trauma, and repetition. Ashraf H.A.
Rushdy relates that it is these “questions about desire and despair, about subject and
object, about the possibility for self-knowledge, about, finally, memory and being that
Toni Morrison’s novels ask”.42 These questions Morrison explores in Playing in the
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Dark, and in her fiction benefit from and reflect the very questions with which
psychoanalysis is invested in.
By exploring the ways that expressions of (white) American identity are
indicative of a sense of white subjectivity in a racist nation, Morrison arrives at the
conclusion that the dark Africanism found in American literature is an expression of the
white writers themselves, and of white subjectivity. Morrison explains that “As a writer
reading, I came to realize the obvious: the subject of the dream is the dreamer”.43 In other
words, dark Africanist expressions are also representative of a repressed and externalized
facet of (white) American consciousness—a repressed sense of lack within the self, not
outside of it. Morrison reiterates that what she aims to study is “how the image of a
reined-in, bound, suppressed, and repressed darkness became objectified in American
literature as an Africanist persona”.44 Africanism can be understood as an expression of
anxiety, one that is cast off and relegated to an image external to the self in an effort to
banish or repress it. When faced with the real of one’s existence, with the incompleteness
and mortality of being, this action allows the subject to sustain his/her fantasy of reality
in which the subject is a whole, complete, being, allowing the subject to avoid contact
with the real, traumatic rupture or void that predicates being. Copjec explains that
“Anxiety signals that the threat cannot be exteriorized, objectified, that it is instead
internal, brought on by an encounter with that limit which prevents one’s coincidence
with oneself”.45 Rather than face what Lacan terms the traumatic real of being, these
Africanist expressions represent a repressed and externalized fear of the subject’s own
43
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lack of freedom, what follows here is fantasized into that which can allow the subject to
overcome the lack. This notion of Africanism reflects the Lacanian notion of the
“monstrosity of the neighbor,” or what Lacan labeled as das Ding (the Thing), that Freud
designates as the “ultimate object of our desires in its unbearable intensity and
impenetrability”.46 In other words, the subject represses within itself that which it fears
the most, one’s deepest anxieties, desires, and emptiness, and casts it onto others to
negate confronting the traumatic void of the real.
For Morrison, this self-reflexive relationship of the white American writer to the
Africanist presence in American literature is inextricably tied to race and the color of the
slave body in contrast to the free white body. The concept of race and color intertwined
with freedom and oppression is central to “Americanness”. Morrison reiterates that
“Race, in fact, now functions as a metaphor so necessary to the construction of
Americanness that it rivals the old pseudo-scientific and class-informed racisms whose
dynamics we are more used to deciphering”.47 American identity and the American state
are founded upon notions of race, to the point that Americanness cannot be defined
without it. Morrison explains that “American means white, and Africanist people struggle
to make the term applicable to themselves with ethnicity and hyphen after hyphen after
hyphen”.48 If one is white and a citizen of the United States, he/she is simply labeled as
“American,” while every other group is defined by another term before American—
African American, Latin American, Asian American, Native American—and the list of
groups designated as “other” before “American” continues. Whiteness can be understood
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as what Lacan defines as the “master signifier,” upon which an entire discourse is
constructed.49 Sheldon George claims that “Racial whiteness is just such a signifier,
establishing slavery as a nodal point for the myths of race that still retain levels of
structural control over American society and its social Symbolic”.50 Race is what
organizes and defines American society today, and this is due to the history of slavery
that built and defined the birth of the American state. The concepts of “Americanness” or
American identity are in-articulable or impossible to understand apart from the discourse
and concept of race, as designated by the “master signifier” of whiteness. Morrison
clarifies that the color of the slave body was not just a color, but had been imbedded with
meaning, one defined and employed by scholars at the very least beginning in the 18th
century, the same historical moment when scholars began to explore concepts of “natural
history” and the “inalienable rights of man,” or “human freedom”.51 Ideas of liberty,
independence, and the rights of man upon which the US is understood to be founded were
conceived in tandem with definitions and ideas of race, and worked to further bolster and
define the free white man in early America.
Copjec explores why it is that race is such a persistent, violent, and organizing
concept in the social symbolic. She explains the onset of modernity expelled the notion of
an afterlife as real or guaranteed, and the notion of race allowed one to escape mortality,
and to somehow continue to live on after death by being part of a lineage that continues
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to exist.52 Copjec states that “This idea is a negative one… Yet it is what survives of
eternity in the modern world, and it lends to a certain notion of ideality that is the source
of its profound violence and its disdain for every historical obstacle, every contingency
that opposes it”.53 The need to transcend historical contingency that Morrison reiterates
as the reason immigrants traveled to the New World, necessitating a subjective and
collective identity of Americanness, constructed with notions of freedom and
independence, illustrates Copjec’s Lacanian understanding of the appeal and endurance
of race. Copjec’s delineation of race and its appeal is rooted in Lacan’s concept of the
“super-ego”. The super-ego exerts pressure on the subject to enjoy the jouissance, or
excess pleasure, of race to an obscene degree. The fantasy that sustains the subject’s
reality is inherently linked to a sense of lack, and what Lacan defines as the Law of
Desire, imbedded in the super-ego, that calls one to search and obtain the missing kernel
of the self. The Law of Desire is the “agency that tells you to act in accord with your
desire,” while the super-ego “exerts its unbearable pressure upon us on behalf of our
betrayal of the ‘law of desire’”.54 The concept of race taps into these psychical
components, providing the subject with the false perception that race will negate the
feeling of lack, while also providing an avenue to not only perceive oneself as complete,
but as limitlessness by being part of a lineage that will continue. The super-ego exerts
pressure on the subject to satisfy his/her inherent sense of lack by identifying oneself
through the concept of race.
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Just as Africanism is a conduit for the expression of (white) American anxiety,
fears, and desires, it also functions to define and validate white men’s sense of freedom.
Much in the same way that Agamben’s homo sacer figure functions to define the group
of recognized citizens, the presence of slaves, and the Africanism expressed in American
literature highlights the freedom of white men. Copjec via Lacan provides a
psychoanalytic understanding of this subjective and collective identification, rather the
sort of structural exploration of biopolitics that Agamben is invested in. The construction
of Africanism as such, is arises from the Law of Desire and the super-ego, providing an
avenue through which the “American self knows itself as not enslaved, but free; not
repulsive, but desirable; not helpless, but licensed and powerful; not history-less, but
historical; not damned, but innocent; not a blind accident of evolution, but a progressive
fulfillment of destiny”. Race and the expression of Africanism not only betray the (white)
American subject’s anxiety, it also grants a certain pleasure and enjoyment to the subject
that it validates. Working from Freud’s Moses and Monotheism, Copjec presents the case
for why psychoanalysis provides a method for interrogating notions of race and the
pleasure a subject can experience from investing his/herself within such a matrix. Copjec
explains that in Moses and Monotheism, Freud stripped ideality away from race and
revealed an “anonymous root of racial identity, in a useless, exorbitant pleasure,” or what
Lacan defines as jouissance.55 An excess of pleasure, or racial jouissance the subject
experiences accounts for the close proximity of the white, free body to the enslaved,
black body. This excess of pleasure can also account for Agamben’s biopolitical
explanation of the slave-master relationship as the “striking and despondent intimacy
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between master and slave”.56 Morrison cites Mark Twain’s The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn as an example of an expression of this relationship in American
literature. She writes that it is only through Huck and the slave Jim’s close relationship
that Huck is able to articulate his sense of independence and freedom, and why Jim could
not be freed at the end of the story. Morrison explains that “freedom has no meaning for
Huck or to the text without the specter of enslavement, the anodyne to individualism; the
yardstick of absolute power over the life of another; the signed, marked, informing and
mutating presence of a black slave.57
Conclusion
Questions of race, history, trauma, and subjective identification that Morrison
explores in Playing in the Dark and in her fiction, benefit from and enhance the concept
of biopolitics, as conceived by Agamben, and Copjec’s conception of the Lacanian
subject and race as predicated by a traumatic void, or inherent rupture. Placing these three
writers in dialogue with one another is valuable in interrogating notions of American
exceptionalism, race, racial violence, and the construction of (white) American identity.
It will also be useful in understanding how Morrison explores black subjectivity, as a
result of white subjectivity and dominance, within her works of fiction. Morrison’s
critique of American identity and subjectivity in Playing in the Dark is an innovative and
necessary approach to understanding why the American state is constructed through
racism and oppression, why it persists so today, and lays the groundwork to study how
race and racism impact those who perpetrate and sustain such systems of oppression in
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tandem with further study of the impact of racism on the oppressed. The intellectual
projects of each of these writers aims to explore notions of subjectivity, and why it is that
individuals adhere to and support oppressive structures in an attempt to claim a sense of
wholeness or autonomy. The concepts and discourses that each writer provides is of value
in exploring some of the most difficult questions about race, violence, and oppression.
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CHAPTER 2: BIOPOLITICS AND THE RACIALIZATION OF LAW AND
CITIZENSHIP IN A MERCY AND HOME
Introduction
Morrison’s novels often explore and question the ways race, oppression, and
violence are imbedded within the cultural technologies that produce and sustain
Eurocentric-oriented notions of American identity and subjectivity. To accomplish this,
her novels are each purposefully set in a specific moment in American history, moments
whose historiographies are mythologized as indicative of American “progress”.
Morrison’s novels illustrate the gender, class, and racial violence that proliferates in these
mythologized historical periods, and in doing so, demonstrates the violence at the core of
the American state. Her stories demonstrate that the law is not a guarantor of justice, but
instead functions to perpetuate injustices against its citizens, particularly its marginalized
populations, in the name of prosperity and protection for recognized and valued citizens.
In a 1974 review of The Black Book published in The New York Times Magazine, a
project Morrison undertook as an editor for Random House, Inc. before publishing her
first novel, she takes these historiographies to task, stating that “There are very few
examinations of U.S. economics as the growth of a country that had generations of free
labor to assure that growth. Or of the legal history of this country as primarily the efforts
of the courts to contain blacks.”58 Morrison writes that in the process of editing The Black
Book, she was “overwhelmed with the connecting tissue between black and white

58

Toni Morrison and Carolyn C. Denard, What Moves at the Margin: Selected Nonfiction, (Jackson:
University Press of Mississippi, 2008), 48.

32

history,” a connection that “was not a simple one of white oppressor and black victim.”59
This connection is multifaceted, and Morrison aims to demonstrate that white and black
history in the Unites States are not separate phenomena, but rather a collective and
intertwined history, and should be understood and studied as such.
Morrison’s novels A Mercy and Home each illustrate and explore this collective
history by dispelling mythologized accounts of their historical settings. A Mercy is set in
the 1680’s in the north during colonization, when the slave trade in America is just
beginning to prosper. This time is often perceived as the “birth” of America, defined by
the excitement and liberty the New World provided for those leaving Europe in search of
a new life and opportunity. A Mercy narrates the foundations of American racism and the
racialization of slavery and oppression during colonization, combatting the dominant
narrative of prosperity, independence, and adventure attributed to this era, for one defined
by division and forceful dominance. Home is set during the 1950’s in the South, a
historical moment often characterized by the growth of the American middle class and
the promise and fulfillment of the American dream. This novel reminds the reader that
this era is also characterized by the Jim Crow black codes in the South, and the Korean
War that is often overlooked as part of the “post-war” decades following World War II.
As Morrison details in Playing in the Dark, the formation of American identity, along
with notions of independence and liberty, were not formulated apart from slavery, but are
inherently connected to it, much in the same way that the growth of the middle class
during the 1950’s and notions of the actualization of the American Dream during this
time, are also inherently linked to the black codes and Jim Crow. Just as Agamben claims
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in Homo Sacer that it is the production of bare life necessitated in a biopolitical structure
through which democratic states operate, these novels demonstrate how slavery and the
continuance of racial oppression is foundational to the American state. These systems of
oppression and the laws under which they operate are “interpreted and twisted by those in
dominant positions and manipulated to conceal the interest of racial or gendered power in
the mendacious language of universality,” and it is this history that Morrison’s fiction
draws our attention to.60 Agamben’s analysis of homo sacer and biopolitics is useful in
interrogating these oppressive structures, and Morrison’s explorations of subjective
identification and formation within a racialized American system both expands upon and
provides further illustration to Agamben’s conception of biopolitics. Analyzing these
novels through the lens of biopolitics demonstrates the collective and interconnected
histories of white and black America, and accounts for the state’s validation of racial
violence and oppression.
Biopolitics, and the Construction of Racial Hierarchy in A Mercy
Agamben’s biopolitical analysis of violence and the modern democratic nation
state hinges on the classical concept of homo sacer. Homo sacer represents what he
designates as “bare life” that can be killed with impunity, but cannot be sacrificed—a
human animal, or an individual who is included in the social/political realm through
his/her exclusion, holds no political status, and is therefore left without protection from
the state.61 Homo sacer is a figure that is submitted to the law, but is not protected by it.
For Agamben, homo sacer represents an individual who is denied political and symbolic
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signification. Agamben writes that homo sacer is the “originary exception in which
human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity
to be killed”.62 In Morrison’s novels, she often represents black characters as homo sacer
figures. They are included in the social sphere, are submitted to a rule of law that
discriminates against them, yet receive no protection from it. Homo sacer represents the
dangerous binary biopolitics operates through, one defined by the separation of chosen,
recognized citizens from excluded others. In A Mercy, Morrison draws attention to the
construction of such a binary in the New World, invoking a “deeply ironic look at
American origins”.63 What is unique about Morrison’s depiction of the New World and
colonization in A Mercy is that each of the characters is represented as homo sacer,
particularly the female characters. Any sense of solidarity that exists between them,
however, fractures as notions of racial hierarchy become widely accepted, and formalized
through law. Susan Strehle claims that American exceptionalism, the notion of a
“redeemer nation” and its “chosen people” central to American cultural identity, also
accounts for the reasoning behind white colonists’ enslavement of people of color,
explaining that “A Mercy emphasizes divisions, distinctions, and distances, as it portrays
in the colonies a potential community stifled at its inception by the assumption of an
exceptionalist destiny”.64 The characters Jacob Vaark and Rebekka Vaark perhaps most
fully portray this sense of American exceptionalism, as they each forgo their sense of
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morality and “liberal” thinking to participate in a system of hierarchy and oppression,
practices they both pointedly stand against at the novel’s beginning.
A Mercy is set at a time before the racialization of slavery, when the slave codes
were first being implemented. Morrison refers to Bacon’s Rebellion (1676) in the
beginning of the novel when the reader is first introduced to Jacob Vaark, an AngloDutch settler and trader, as he is riding through the territory where this rebellion took
place. The omniscient narrator tells the reader that Jacob has his guard up, as “In this
territory he could not be sure of friend or foe”.65This is due to the fact that there is no
visual marker, such as race or class, yet available to designate someone as trustworthy or
otherwise to Jacob. The narrator explains that the rebellion was fought by “an army of
blacks, natives, whites, mulattoes—freedmen, slaves, and indentured [servants]” that had
“waged war against the local gentry led by members of that very class”.66 Men from
every race and class had banded together in an attempt to overthrow the ruling class. This
rebellion illustrates the current, yet changing landscape of the colonies at this time. Being
a slave was not yet synonymous with being black—there were a number of indentured
servants and slaves of a variety races and ethnicities, including Native Americans, who
labored together.67 This rebellion instigated the formation of the slave laws, so that the
lower classes would be divided by race, preventing their joining in a form of resistance
together against the gentry. The narrator explains the reasoning behind the black codes,
that by “eliminating manumission, gatherings, travel and bearing arms for black people

65

Toni Morrison, A Mercy, 11.
Ibid.
67
Jessica Wells Cantiello, "From Pre-Racial to Post-Racial? Reading and Reviewing "A Mercy" in the Age of
Obama," MELUS 36, no. 2 (2011), 167.
66

36

only; by granting license to any white to kill any black for any reason; by compensating
owners for a slave’s maiming or death, they separated and protected all whites from all
others forever”.68 A hierarchy was established to divide the laboring classes, and race
became the mark of this division, fueled by the growth of the slave trade in the Americas.
Jessica W. Cantiello reiterates that the novel’s setting “approaches the era when race
began to be codified in the United States; most of the characters were born into a
relatively pre-racial era but would die in a racial period”.69 “Pre-racial” does not mean
that the characters in A Mercy are not raced, but that their racial identities are understood
differently than they would be in later periods in American history.
Jacob views himself as morally above such hierarchical forms of oppression and
violence. He understands laws such as the slave codes to be “lawless laws encouraging
cruelty in exchange for common cause, if not common virtue”.70 His perceived sense of
compassion is emphasized when the narrator tells us that he dismounted his horse twice
during his journey, the second time in order to rescue a baby raccoon whose leg was
trapped in a tree break.71 Jacob is traveling to Maryland, at that time owned by the king,
in order to collect a debt owed him, the narrator tells of his “disdain” for the Catholics in
Maryland and how they have amassed wealth through the slave and tobacco businesses,
which are dependent to each other.72 However, this is not enough to stop him from doing
business with these people. Once he arrives at his destination, his debtor, D’Ortega,
offers Jacob slaves to repay his debt, to which Jacob “winced” in response, as “Flesh was
68
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not his commodity”.73 In order to “silence” D’Ortega, Jacob points to a slave woman with
a baby and says he will take her.74 The slave woman instead offers her daughter, Florens,
in her place, and a deal is struck. Despite Jacob’s sense of moral superiority and disdain
for the slave trade, he accepts a slave and does make “flesh his commodity.” Directly
following this business exchange, the narrator states that Jacob “was determined to prove
that his own industry could amass the fortune, the station, D’Ortega claimed without
trading his conscience for coin.”75 Though Jacob did not literally “trade his conscience
for coin,” he did trade his conscience for a human being, Florens, whom he and D’Ortega
valued at “twenty pieces of eight.”76 Jacob is completely unaware of his moral hypocrisy,
and throughout the novel, he is able to reason with himself for each immoral act he
commits in his quest for prosperity. Strehle states that “Jacob reflects the best traits and
intentions of the American pioneer, particularly the commitment to finding his own way
in the new land without falling into the corrupt practices that he associates with
Europe”.77 Jacob embodies the paradox Morrison illustrates in Early America, rooted in
notions of American exceptionalism, in which he is able to understand his actions,
however hypocritical and corrupt, as validated by his compassionate nature and work
ethic. Though as Jacob demonstrates, embodying distaste for cruelty and corruption is not
paradoxical to his actions, but indeed becomes the reason he is able to forgive himself for
them.
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The reason that Jacob Vaark is able to make an exception to his moral stance
against slavery and trading “flesh as a commodity,” is representative of what Agamben
designates as the “state of exception,” through which sovereign power operates, and the
power of the law acts outside of the law. Agamben writes that “the sovereign, having the
legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law.”78
In other words, sovereign power, or state power, is able to transgress the law, to make an
“exception” that it is able to validate. An example of this sort of power is represented in
our nation’s current moment through the death penalty, the killing of civilians by the
police, or going to war---though killing another individual is unlawful, the state is able to
transgress this law and kill under certain circumstances—a state of exception. Susan
Strehle connects Agamben’s notion of the state of exception to the American
exceptionalism illustrated in A Mercy, claiming that the state of exception operates when
“a nation justifies suspending its laws in the interest of security,” and that “faith in the
nation’s exceptional moral stance blinds U.S. citizens to the corruption of national ideals
when the state makes exceptions to the rule.”79 This notion is reflected in A Mercy when
the narrator explains how the slave codes were meant to “separate and protect all whites
from all others forever.”80 The slave codes were understood to be for the protection of the
colonists, and were therefore not acknowledged as immoral or corrupt.
The exception to the rule becomes the rule in biopolitics. Agamben reiterates that
“all law is ‘situational law,’” and that the decision that is made under these situations or
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“exceptions” illuminates state or sovereign authority.81 Jacob reveals this most acutely
when he reasons with himself for accepting Florens, the slave girl, by recalling a similar
situation a decade prior, in which “he found it hard to refuse when called on to rescue an
unmoored, unwanted child”.82 This child is a girl named Sorrow, whom Jacob reasoned
would provide much needed help for his wife, Rebekka on their property. Their sons died
as young children, and she needed assistance with upkeep and labor. He accepted Sorrow
from a sawyer who found her “half dead” on the shore, and “Jacob agreed to do it,
provided the sawyer forgive the cost of the lumber he was buying.”83Though Jacob
claims that “flesh” is not his “commodity,” in validating his decision to accept Florens
for the repayment of a debt, the reader learns that he has already engaged in such
practices before when accepting Sorrow. Jacob believes that the “acquisition of both
[Florens and Sorrow] could be seen as a rescue”.84 Jacob also has another woman
laboring on his farm named Lina, a Native American who was the “only” one that he had
“purchased outright and deliberately,” implying her situation was different because “she
was a woman, not a child”.85 Jacob does not realize that he is dealing in flesh, something
he claims he has no respect for and would not become involved in, yet his sense of moral
superiority blinds him from the fact that he deliberately participates in a business that he
criticizes. Jacob’s story illustrates how in colonial America, “ideological dominance and
hegemony were forming,” in what has been defined as a “contact zone,” or space before
the “acceleration of the Atlantic slave trade” in which “competing imperialisms,
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economic migrants, slaves, indentured European laborers, indigenous people, and
religious exiles were vying to make the landscape of the new world legible in terms that
claimed continuity with their prior Weltanschauung [world view].”86 Jacob is unable to
notice his own participation within an inhumane system of corruption and oppression that
he has attempted to avoid. He has merely made an “exception” by accepting these women
for labor, so he does not see his own hypocrisy. Though Jacob understands his actions as
merciful towards the women laboring on his property, he never considers them as whole,
autonomous beings, nor does he consider repaying them for their labor.87
In A Mercy, Morrison represents the enslaved, black characters as homo sacer, as
well as the Native Americans that have also been submitted to this form of oppression,
but must follow the law of the colonists in the “new world”. Florens was offered by her
mother to take her place, so that she would not be taken away from the young baby boy
(Floren’s little brother) that she was still nursing. Florens’s mother also offers her up to
take her place in the deal struck by D’Ortego and Jacob because she feels that Jacob is
not as violent as her own master. Morrison writes during this scene, and repeats
throughout the novel, that the white colonists were in the business of “authorizing chaos
in defense of order,” as black slaves can be killed, raped, or punished without reason,
however their owners see fit.88 This represents Agamben’s notion that the production of
bare life is necessitated by the state to protect and support the individuals that hold
political or social status—the chosen population that must be separated and protected. It
is this separation that defines the subjectivity of those within the protection of the law and
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society. Agamben writes that “exteriority—the law of nature and the principle of the
preservation of one’s own life—is truly the innermost center of the political system.”89
Florens’s mother understands the colonists’ reasoned violence and the slave’s status
within the colonies, which is why she asks Jacob Vaark to take her daughter instead of
herself, hoping that this man will provide a refuge for Florens, knowing that she and her
daughter are merely “bare life” for the colonists. In this scene, Florens is described as a
“raccoon baby stuck in a trap,” further emphasizing her dehumanized and captured state,
while also referencing the moment Jacob dismounts his horse on his journey to D’ortega
in order to rescue a raccoon stuck in a tree.90 The repeated image of the trapped raccoon
draws attention to how Jacob’s own sense of moral superiority and compassion blinds
him to his involvement in the slave business by accepting Florens to settle a debt. He
believes himself to be a kind and compassionate individual, the kind who stops to help
free a trapped animal, though he traps Florens, participating in the slave businesses, a fact
that he is willfully ignorant of.
A Mercy illustrates the racialization of slavery and citizenship in the new world,
while also demonstrating how all women are homo sacer figures, included in the state
through their exclusion. It is for this reason that the separation and distancing of the
women on the Vaark farm is particularly tragic: though at the beginning of the story,
Rebekka, Lina, Florens, and Sorrow all share a sense of vulnerability and solidarity as
women, by the end of the story, Rebekka asserts a sense of dominance and superiority,
and the women become divided. Rebekka’s changing relationship with Lina, the Native
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American woman Jacob purchased to help her, is perhaps most telling of her
transformation and the division of this community of women. Rebekka explains that her
parents’ religious beliefs were “fueled by a wondrous hatred,” claiming that “Shallow
believers preferred a shallow god,” understanding herself to be different and separate
from this set of beliefs, much in the same way that Jacob understands himself to be
morally superior to the colonists thriving in the growing slave business.91 At first,
Rebekka is distrustful of Lina, clinging to racialized notions of “savage” Natives
encouraged by her religious upbringing. Rebekka remembers that she “bolted the door at
night and would not let the raven-haired girl with impossible skin sleep anywhere near.”92
Rebekka explains that over time, “perhaps because they were both alone without family,
or because both had to please one man [Jacob], or because both were ignorant of how to
run a farm, they became what was for each a companion.”93 It is when Rebekka gives
birth to her first baby boy that dies, that she comes to trust Lina fully. Rebekka
reminisces that “when the first infant was born, Lina handled it so tenderly, with such
knowing,” that she was “ashamed of her early fears and pretended she never had them.”94
Rebekka forms a bond with Lina and is able to assuage herself of any guilt. However, for
a time, both women, as well as all of the women on the farm, are able to be companions
to each other.
Rebekka recounts her life before coming to the New World, and the women she
met and bonded with on her passage to explain her sense of compassion and solidarity
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with other women, regardless of class or racial differences. Rebekka’s father in essence
sold her to Jacob to be his wife, as Jacob was in search of a “healthy, chaste wife willing
to travel abroad,” and was willing to “reimburse” the family for traveling and clothing
expeses.95 Rebekka relates a lack of choice in the matter, though came to terms with it as
“her prospects were servant, prostitute, wife, and although horrible stories were told
about each of those careers, the last one seemed safest.”96 Rebekka, like Jacob, views the
new world as an opportunity for a different life than she would have had in England,
while being fully aware of her status as a homo sacer type figure, due to her gender.
Strehle explains that “Like her husband, Rebekka has no nostalgia for London, which she
recalls as a place of hatred, discomfort, and narrow-mindedness; while he [Jacob] is
literally an orphan, she has been figuratively sold by her parents to the first man who
would pay her passage.”97 Rebekka can experience a sense of compassion and solidarity
with Lina and the other women on the farm, as women are similar in many ways. This is
emphasized by the fact that Rebekka was also “sold” to Jacob. During her passage to the
states, Rebekka was a young girl all alone, taken in by the prostitutes and lower class
women on the ship. They provided her with a safe space and a feeling of community, and
it is this experience that forms her sensitivity to the specific oppressions that all women
have in common. Rebekka looks back fondly on her memories with the women on the
ship, understanding them, and herself included, as “Women of and for men,” though in
their moments of fellowship, “they were neither.”98 Rebekka carries this sense of
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solidarity she experiences with the prostitutes on the ship to her relationship with the
women laboring on her farm. Rebekka relates that “although they had nothing in common
with the views of each other, they had everything in common with one thing: the promise
and threat of men.”99 Agamben explains that all beings in a biopolitical system are homo
sacer, regardless of class standing or race, because all “human life is included in the
political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed.”100 While all
individuals in the new world can be seen as homo sacer, Rebekka and the other women
are made acutely aware of this status as women who exist at the expense of men.
After her husband Jacob dies and Rebekka herself falls dangerously ill, she joins a
religious sect she once criticized, and begins treating the other women, and especially
Lina, as beneath her. Rebekka overlooks her solidarity and similar status with these
women, and commits herself to an ideology of racial superiority; validated by a belief
that she is part of god’s chosen people. Scully, an indentured servant on the Vaark’s farm,
notices this shift in Rebekka’s worldview, explaining that “She was a penitent, pure and
simple. Which to him meant that underneath her piety was something cold, if not
cruel.”101 Like Jacob, Rebekka’s sense of piety and moral superiority blind her to her own
acts of cruelty and oppression. Though Lina is devoted to her throughout her illness,
practicing her own medicinal techniques to help heal her, once Rebekka recovers, she
credits God for her healing, and prohibits Lina from her cultural practices, makes her cut
her hair, and forces her to accompany Rebekka to church services, though she is not
allowed to enter the building. Rebekka also plans to sell Florens and Sorrow. These
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changes in Rebekkah’s beliefs and actions “are significant because, although she has
expressed a feminist understanding of the plight of women under patriarchal
oppression…she now betrays all of the women who have formed her community,” and in
doing so, sells her integrity and plans to sell her female companions in order to fit in with
the racist Anabaptists.102 Rebekka’s change of heart and treatment of the other women on
her farm represents the roots of white feminism: she forgoes her compassion and
solidarity for all women, participating in racial hierarchy for her own benefit, viewing
lower class women and women of color as beneath her and her own concerns as a
woman. Not only does she treat Lina with contempt, but she begins to beat Sorrow as
well. Morrison writes that “the family they imagined they had become was false.”103
The narratives of Jacob and Rebekka Vaark illustrate the formation of division
that a biopolitical system necessitates. The organization of racial hierarchy forms in the
New World due to such systematic necessities, while the white colonists are able to
validate the inhumane acts they commit to satisfy their own needs. Rebekka and Jacob
partake in the very type of hierarchical system they each claim to condemn, but are not
able to see how they have constructed their subjectivities and way of being in support of
such systems. They fail to “understand that their presence and the settlements to which
they belong are forged in violence,” nor that they presence and new life means the end of
an existence that Lina, and other Native Americans once knew.104 Their willing
participation in the business of slavery and the belief in their own moral superiority
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illustrate how they become fully imbedded in such systems of violence and oppression.
Rebekka in particular comes to focus on the differences between herself and the other
women rather than their similarities, as she once did. She participates in a system that
organizes functions to organize these women hierarchically, rather than continue to notice
their similar status as women who embody homo sacer, and can be reduced to bare life
under patriarchy.
Bare Life and the Law in Home
In Home, Morrison explores racism and violence in the Unites States in the late
1950’s, a time that is often portrayed with nostalgia in cultural productions and by rightwing politicians. By doing so, she demonstrates how, as Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor writes
in From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation, “Race and racism have not been
exceptions; instead, they have been the glue that hold the United States together.”105 The
racialization of crime, the black codes, and class and race targeted laws such as
“vagrancy” laws that Taylor outlines in her sociological and historical survey of race,
inequality, and mass incarceration, are historical truths illustrated in Home. In Morrison’s
1994 article, “On the Backs of Blacks,” she writes that “There is virtually no movement
up—for blacks or whites, established classes or arrivistes—that is not accompanied by
race talk. Refusing, negotiating, or fulfilling this demand is the real stuff, the organizing
principle of becoming an American. Star-spangled. Race-Strangled.”106 This concept is
represented by the novel’s protagonist, Frank, and his sister, Cee. Frank and Cee both
portray how black Americans are reduced to “bare life,” or represent homo sacer figures,
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explicitly so during the Jim Crow era preceding the civil rights movement. This is a time
often defined by the growth of the middle-class in the United States, after slavery had
ended and African Americans could begin to move up in socioeconomic status. Frank and
Cee’s stories illustrate how this mythologized past is not accurate to the struggles that
those of color faced then, and still face now. In the 25th Jefferson Lecture in the
Humanities given by Morrison in 1996 entitled, “The Future of Time: Literature and
Diminished Expectations,” she speaks of the American political practice of glorifying the
past, noting that “The fifties, the current favorite, has acquired a gloss of voluntary
orderliness, of ethnic harmony, although it was a decade of outrageous political and
ethnic persecution. And here one realizes that the dexterity of political language is
stunning, stunning and shameless.”107 The stories of Frank and his sister Cee in Home
function to portray the “outrageous political and ethnic persecution” Morrison relates
above, while also illustrating the way black Americans during this time are included in
the American state through their exclusion—representing the law of exteriority that
Agamben outlines in his analysis of homo sacer and biopolitics.
Frank Money’s narrative demonstrates how black men, specifically during the
1950’s, constitute what Agamben designates as homo sacer, or life that can be killed with
impunity. Agamben claims that the “fundamental biopolitical structure of modernity”
centers on the “decision on the value (or nonvalue) of life as such,” while sovereign
power, wielded by the state, holds charge over this decision.108 From the beginning of the
novel, Frank is made to confront the notion that his life as a black man is not valued, and
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can in fact be killed without consequence. The opening scene of Home is a childhood
flashback memory written in italics, depicting Frank and Cee as children hiding in a field,
watching white men ride up on horses to bury the body of a black man after a lynching.
Frank narrates, “we saw them pull a body from a wheelbarrow and throw it into a hole
already waiting.”109 One of the first memories Frank can recall from his childhood is this
scene of a black body being discarded carelessly. Frank relates to the reader in recounting
this memory, “I really forgot about the burial. I only remembered the horses. They were
so beautiful. So brutal. And they stood like men.”110 The horses “stood like men,” while a
black body was being dumped into a make-shift grave dug in a farm field. Candice L.
Pipes writes that “The burial demonstrates the reality of the Jim Crow governed
South….the horses were more like men than black men were like men.”111 The
juxtaposition of these two images demonstrates that the horses are treated with more
dignity and respect than black men. Frank’s narration of this flashback depicts that he
understands this, yet he does not want to acknowledge it outright, detailing the power and
stature of the horses rather than the dehumanized state of the discarded black body. This
scene represents how black men in the Jim Crow South could be reduced to bare life,
demonstrating a political state in which subjective identification is realized through the
exclusion and destruction of the Other.112 This opening scene illustrates the value, or
rather the nonvalue of black men’s lives while reflecting the violent biopolitical binary
Agamben outlines.
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Frank’s story begins in the northern United States while he is traveling back to his
home in Lotus, GA after fighting in the Korean War. He is arrested because he had
“swerved his head wildly to see where he was going,” and institutionalized in the mental
health ward of a hospital, where he has been sedated.113 Frank awakes in the hospital,
plotting his escape, but cannot find a pair of shoes, the omniscient narrator telling the
reader that “Walking anywhere in winter without shoes would guarantee his being
arrested and back in the ward until he could be sentenced for vagrancy.”114 Frank’s arrest
for moving his head quickly and the mention of vagrancy laws references how black men
are separated from the rest of the population, and heavily policed. It also demonstrates a
northern United States that is not that much better for black Americans than the Jim Crow
South. Morrison writes, “Interesting law, vagrancy, meaning standing outside or walking
without clear purpose, anywhere.”115 Frank is arrested for making a sudden movement,
and he understands that he would likely be arrested again for walking outside without
shoes. He has already been medically sedated because the innocent action that prompted
his arrest was seen as threatening. This scene stands in sharp contrast to the opening
scene of the burial flashback, in which a black man was lynched and the police were
nowhere to be seen. Taylor explains that during this time, in the North as well as the
South, there were state regulations known as the “black codes,” a series “laws, rules, and
restrictions imposed only on African Americans” which “criminalized poverty,
movement, and even leisure. Blacks could be arrested for vaguely worded or innocuous
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‘crimes’ such as ‘vagrancy’.”116 Frank’s run-in with the law at the beginning of his story,
illustrating the black codes Taylor outlines, demonstrates how the state functions to
protect white citizens, while African Americans receive no such protection, and are in
fact terrorized by the police in the interest of protecting whites. The narrator states that
“better than most, he [Frank] knew that being outside wasn’t necessary for legal or illegal
disruption,” as “men with or without badges, but always with guns could force you, your
family, your neighbors to pack and move.”117 This claustrophobic scene of Frank plotting
his escape from the hospital seems to parallel the notion of being trapped or suffocated by
the state anywhere he goes.
Once Frank escapes the hospital and finds shelter for the night from Reverend
John Locke, he learns that being arrested is not the worst thing that could have happened
had he not escaped. When Reverend Locke learns that Frank has escaped the hospital, he
tells him, “You lucky, Mr. Money. They sell a lot of bodies out there.”118 Frank is
shocked by this suggestion, to which Reverend Locke responds, “Well, you know,
doctors need to work on the dead poor so they can help the rich live.”119 This shocking
insight demonstrates how black bodies and poor bodies can be reduced to bare life for the
benefit of privileged citizens, while also foreshadowing what happens to Frank’s sister
Cee. Agamben explains that in a biopolitical system, the biological health of citizens
becomes the state’s concern, and the institution of medicine becomes intertwined with
economics and the needs of the state, “Hence the radical transformation of the meaning
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and duties of medicine, which is increasingly integrated into the functions and the organs
of the state…”120 Doctors and the state are able to make decisions about bare life based
on the needs of the state, which is why Reverend Locke tells Frank that the bodies of the
poor are used as bare life for the benefit of more privileged citizens. Agamben’s analysis
uses the Third Reich and concentration camp as the basis of his interrogation, claiming
that it is only through understanding the biopolitical structure that works to benefit the
health of the chosen population of citizens that one can grasp the Third Reich’s project, in
which the harvesting and extinguishing of the Jewish body was for the benefit of the
German, or European body.121 Though Agamben’s analysis focuses on a different
historical phenomenon, applying his concepts to the depictions of the treatment of people
of color and poor people in Home demonstrates a similar relationship between bodies and
the state that Agamben examines occurring in the novel. This brings about some cogent
questions and insights into certain state structures and historical phenomenon in the
United States that Morrison’s novel gestures to.
Frank stops next in Chicago on his journey back home to Georgia, and what he
learns from the family he stays with while there further disproves the notion that
Northern states were much better or safer for African Americans than the South. He
notices that the family’s small boy has a crooked arm and the father, Billy, tells him that
a policeman shot his son while he was driving by. He tells Frank that the boy was eight
years old and had been playing outside with a toy gun when “Some redneck rookie
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thought his dick was underappreciated by his brother cops.”122 When Frank responds,
“You can’t just shoot a kid,” the boy’s father, Billy, tells him that “Cops shoot anything
they want. This here’s a mob city.”123 This is an example of how the black characters in
home are depicted as what Agamben defines as figures reduced to a state of bare life.
Using the Third Reich as a primary example, Agamben explains how in such a
biopolitical system, “the only real question to be decided was which form of organization
would be best suited to the task of assuring the care, control, and use of bare life.”124
Heavy policing and police brutality are an example of the state’s attempt to “control”
bare life for the benefit and protection of valued and privileged citizens. Taylor explains
why relations between the police and the poor, and people of color have always been
fraught with injustice and violence. She writes that “The police function to enforce the
rule of the politically powerful and economic elite,” which is why “poor and working
class communities are so heavily police,” leading her to point out that “if the task of the
police is to maintain law and order, then that role takes on a specific meaning in a
fundamentally racist society.”125 The fact that a child is seen as threatening enough for a
policeman to shoot abruptly illustrates the extent to which racism is imbedded in the
biopolitical state apparatus of the 1950’s America depicted in Home. Later when Frank is
mugged in Atlanta during his journey home, a man asks if he wants to call the police, and
Frank responds, “Hell no,” understanding that he cannot rely on them for protection, and
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in fact, may be found suspicious himself.126The man who asks if he needs help tells Frank
to “Stay in the light” in order to keep safe.127 This illustrates the binary between bare life
that is excluded from the body of the state, and the politically invested life of citizens that
Agamben delineates in Homo Sacer.
The metaphor of war extends throughout the novel. Frank is a returned soldier
who is illustrated fighting another war back in the United States as a black man in a racist
nation. The war flashbacks, which could in this day and age be labeled as PTSD,
emphasize the constant state of war in which Frank finds himself. It is notable that Frank
has returned from the Korean War, and Morrison’s “allusions make clear that the period
after the World Wars can hardly be regarded as having healed the old fissures in a
postwar peace.”128 Frank is a veteran who fought for a state power that does not
recognize his humanity. Candice L. Pipes notes that the reality for black soldiers
returning from the World Wars and the Korean War was a “Jim Crow, segregated
society, which still allowed public lynchings of black people,” and Frank’s experiences in
the North detail that the region does not have much more to offer, and though the North is
not defined by lynchings during this era, police brutality and killings can be seen as
another form of lynching.129 Pipes continues to note that “The untold story is that even as
black soldiers were fighting for the United States of America, for democracy, for their
own respect and dignity, for their humanity, the roots of institutionalized racism were
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being dug even deeper.”130 Frank returns to a Unites States in which racism is thriving,
and the fact that he is a veteran does not ease the danger or conflict that surrounds him.
Frank expresses a hope in the notion that fighting in the war might provide
opportunity or help him gain acknowledgment and respect, or an avenue towards a
different life entirely. He finds his hometown of Lotus, GA unbearable due to “It’s
unforgiving population, its isolation, and its indifference to the future…”131 Frank goes to
war to escape his home, along with his two best friends. Morrison writes that when Frank
tried to explain to Cee why he chose to go to war, “He tried to tell her the army was the
only solution. Lotus was suffocating, killing him and his two best friends. They all
agreed.”132 Even after Frank returns home from the awful things he witnesses in battle, a
section of Frank’s internal dialogue, written in italics, reiterates, “Lotus, Georgia, is the
worst place in the world, worse than any battlefield. At least on the field there is a goal,
excitement, daring, some chance of winning along with many chances of losing.”133 Frank
intentionally places himself in a war, in a situation where he is merely bare life, because
at least in battle, he feels he can fight, where as in Lotus, he feels stagnant in an
environment where he is made to be bare life—it is not a choice he can make. War can be
viewed as a sort of “state of exception” that Agamben describes, in which violence is
prohibited. He describes this kind of biopolitical structure as one where “Bare life is no
longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological
body of every living being,” implying that this is also true in modern democratic state
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structures—the state of exception and bare life are not confined to the space of the
concentration camp, or in this case, a war.134 Franks experiences at war and at home are
compared to each other, illustrating Agamben’s conception of biopolitics and bare life.
Frank was exposed to what Agamben defines as bare life while at war, and he
constantly battles the memories of the atrocities he witnessed. The violence and racial
policing he witnessed after returning from war trigger memories of fighting in Korea,
implying connection or comparison between the two spaces. He remembers witnessing a
starving young Korean girl being killed by a solider. It is only later in the story that he
realizes that he was the solider that shot this girl, a memory that he had repressed. The
girl was searching through trash looking for food, eventually grabbing the solder’s crotch
saying “Yum Yum,” and the soldier, whom later is revealed to be Frank himself, “blows
her away.”135 Frank recalls that “Thinking back on it now, I think the guard felt more than
disgust. I think he felt tempted and that is what he had to kill.”136 Frank cannot handle the
truth that he killed this girl, and his memory of how his friend died in battle, in which he
had to locate his friend’s blown-off limb, parallels when he had “blown away” the young
Korean girl. When Frank travels through Atlanta he has a flashback of watching his two
best friends die in battle, stating that “Now they were meat.”137 Frank partakes of this act
of violence, treating an individual as bare life while he is in battle. He partakes in the
same form of violence that he witnesses in back home in America. Penner claims that
Frank “acknowledges being plagued not only by social ills he cannot control but also by
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his participation in them,” his inability to recognize that he is the soldier that killed the
Korean girl is an attempt to obscure the reality that “he, too, uses familiar cultural tropes
to ease his own acts of brutality during the war.”138 He partakes in the system of
biopolitics by killing soldiers in battle and killing the Korean girl, in a space that can be
defined as a state of exception- war. Agamben reiterates that it is “this topological zone
of indistinction, which had to remain hidden from the eyes of justice, that we must try to
fix under our gaze.”139 The state in which Frank finds Cee after returning home forces
him to confront such acts of violence against bare life, since Cee herself has been reduced
to bare life.
Frank travels home after receiving word from a stranger that Cee is ill and in
danger. He is traveling through suburbs outside of Atlanta to locate Cee at the address
provided on the letter he received. Morrison writes that “finding transportation in these
parts was rougher than confronting a battlefield,” which again references the war
metaphor, implicating that Frank is entering into another such space.140 Frank’s sister Cee
goes to work as a housekeeper for a doctor, and ends up being essentially used as a lab rat
so he could conduct experiments on her reproductive organs. Cee is treated as bare life,
being harvested for the service of the designated collection of valued citizens, which
mirrors Reverend Locke’s comments about doctor’s needing to “work on the dead poor
to help the rich live.”141 Cee’s status as “bare life” is what keeps Frank from reporting the
doctor to the police, knowing that black men and women are killed for whatever reason,
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and that the law will not help them in any way, as it exists for and by the white
community. When Frank arrives to take his sister from Dr. Beau, the doctor does not
care to stop him. Morrison writes that for Dr. Beau, Frank taking back his sister was “Just
the kidnapping of an employee he could easily replace,” reinforcing Cee’s status as a
poor black woman in the American South at the time, viewed as bare life for the use of
the designated population of citizens.142Cee’s status is reflective of the harvesting of the
bodies of Jews in the concentration camps that Agamben references in his analysis of
biopolitics. He states that it is “Only from this perspective is it possible to grasp the full
sense of the extermination of the Jews, in which the police and politics, eugenic motives
and ideological motives, the care of the health and fight against the enemy become
absolutely indistinguishable.”143The state of exception becomes the rule in a biopolitical
state structure, and Cee’s status as bare life, being used as a lab rat for the “care of the
health” of the valued population of citizens, exposes binary of bare life and citizen
illustrated throughout the novel.
Frank delivers Cee to a group of elderly black women that had helped to raise
them as children. These women take it upon themselves to bring Cee back to health, not
trusting the medical institution or any other—she must be healed by a group of women
away from such spaces. Much in the same way that Frank did involve the authorities with
Dr. Beau, these women do not trust such institutions, learning to work outside of them.
Morrison writes that “The women handled sickness as though it were an affront, an
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illegal, invading braggart who needed whipping.”144 When he takes her to Miss Ethel’s
house, the women are not surprised to hear of what happened when learning that Cee was
working for a doctor. They berate her for working for a doctor in the first place and not
knowing better, saying, “Men know a slop jar when they see one,” “You ain’t a mule to
be pulling some evil doctor’s wagon,” and “Who told you you was trash?”.145 This
environment is a sharp contrast to the experiences Frank has after returning from war, in
which he is isolated and always on his guard. Cee has a community apart from any state
structure to be healed and taken care of. These women have had to find develop their own
methods of healing and care, establishing their own way of being, while Frank did the
opposite by going away to war and imbedding himself in the very state system that is the
source of his trauma and oppression. Frank must confront the “Realities of race, of
traumatic stress, of guilt and shame, of segregation and disreception, of invisibility…”146
Frank’s experiences at war and at home, and Cee’s experience “working” for Dr. Beau,
both delineate the extent to which violence in predicated and validated in a biopolitical
system, that makes exceptions in order to care for the life of valued citizens.
Conclusion
Both A Mercy and Home revisit periods of American history that are often
mythologized. Morrison is able to illustrate systems of divisions, violence, and
oppression at the root of the American state system, and explores how the subjectivities
of those living with such a system are impacted. Agamben’s analysis of biopolitics is
helpful in delineating the structures of power and citizenship depicted in each novel, and
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the novels function to provide an expanded illustration of Agamben’s interrogation of
biopolitics. These novels illustrate what Agamben recognizes as the “fundamental
biopolitical fracture within itself [the division or separation within the system itself, that
which cannot be included],” which is “what always is and yet must, nevertheless, be
realized; it is the pure source of every identity but must, however, continually be
redefined and purified through exclusion, language, blood, land.”147 Biopolitical
structures function on a binary of bare life and citizen, and although biopolitics aims at all
body politics (because even the citizens are to be subject to the norm of the body, like the
healthy body), it is in regards to bare life that the sovereign state’s structural or
foundational violence becomes visible. In each novel, the characters struggle to construct
their subjectivities in reaction to, or as a part of such a system. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor
writes, the “Black experience unravels what we are supposed to know to be true about
America itself—the land of milk and honey—the land where had work makes dreams
come true,” while this mythology serves the United States in validating its decisions for
intervention and violent action in the interest of caring for its valued citizens.148 A Mercy
illustrates a space where such divisions begin to take place during the formation of the
American state, while Home demonstrates the impact of such divisions and the logics of
the state of exception that validates them, after such ideologies have thrived.
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CHAPTER 3: RACE AND THE RUPTURED SUBJECT IN THE BLUEST EYE AND
BELOVED
Introduction
Toni Morrison’s work challenges the reader to rethink the history of race and
racism in the United States, and how each individual participates in and maintains such
oppressive social and political structures. Her work explores the ways that subjects either
adhere to, or “wake up” from what Lacan defines as the fantasy reality that is founded
upon racial, gender, and sexual oppressions that signify the source of trauma for each
character in her novels. Illustrating how the traumatic history of slavery persists as a facet
of black consciousness and reality, and by writing the internal dialogues of each
character, Morrison explores the desires, conscious and unconscious, of the oppressed
and the oppressors in each narrative. Morrison maintains the belief that “Literature,
sensitive as a tuning fork, is an unblinking witness to the light and shade of the world we
live in,” and her work can be understood as an “unblinking witness” to racial violence,
history, and trauma—phenomenon that have often been silenced, or barely acknowledged
within the dominant narrative of the United States.149 Many of Morrison’s novels detail
the treacherous and violent impacts of racism on the lives of women color. Evelyn Jaffe
Schreiber explains that Morrison’s work delineates notions of the self and home, telling
stories of African American trauma, illustrating how subjects struggle to construct
identities and a sense of self in a racist, patriarchal society.150
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The characters in Morrison’s novels illustrate Lacan’s notion of the ruptured
subject or subject of lack, a concept upon which Lacanian theorist Joan Copjec
foregrounds her work. Copjec identifies a void at the center of racial identity, and this
theoretical understanding provides a necessary framework for interpreting Morrison’s
fiction.151 The characters in Morrison’s novels also provide potent illustrations of
Copjec’s Lacanian understanding of racial and feminine identity as founded on an
inherent rupture, and may even expand upon Copjec’s intellectual work. Copjec’s focus
on the subject’s rupturing, in terms of conceiving racial and feminine identity, are
particularly useful to exploring how Morrison foregrounds the construction of
subjectivity in her novels. The Bluest Eye and Beloved provide particularly impactful
depictions of racial trauma and subjectivity. In The Bluest Eye, all of the black characters,
especially the character of focus, Pecola Breedlove, are constantly aware of their race and
racial history. Pecola falls apart under the weight of her traumatic experience as the ugly,
dark black girl, rejected by everyone around her and raped by her own father, Cholly
Breedlove. Every character in The Bluest Eye, not just Pecola, illustrates the Lacanian
notion of a ruptured subject. Pecola lacks the community or support to conceive of
herself as an individual worthy of love and care, which is ultimately the reason for her
undoing. In Beloved, the protagonist Sethe also faces personal violence and trauma,
though she can be interpreted as a character that is able to make a decision outside of the
fantasmatic realm of subjectivity and reality when she kills her baby to protect her from a
life of slavery. Such an autonomous and self-defining action is a notion that Copjec
analyzes through Lacan’s reading of the story of Antigone. Sethe also has Paul D., an old
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friend who was also enslaved at the plantation she escaped, and they each serve as a
witness to the other’s trauma. At the center of both novels is a concern with personal and
collective healing that must begin with the subject’s restoration.
The Ruptured Subject and the Cycle of Violence in The Bluest Eye
In Imagine There’s No Woman, Copjec begins her analysis of feminine
subjectivity, sublimation, and ethics, by noting why it is that human beings are inherently
ruptured, and why achieving a complete state of being is not possible. She claims, “it is
thought that makes an all of being impossible,” clarifying that what she means is “not that
we cannot think the all of being, but that there is none.”152 It is our capacity for conscious
thought that divides up our being, and the reason why we are predicated by a sense of
lack, causing us to search elsewhere to gain a sense of completeness, which is a futile
mission. This traumatic rupture and sense of lack occurs when the subject enters the
world of language in the Symbolic Order. Our capacity to recognize our individual status
and difference from others and the world around us causes us to compare ourselves to the
external world, and seek outside the self for what seems to be missing. Copjec is
criticizing the duality suggested by Descartes’s statement, “I think therefore I am,” to
demonstrate that it is actually because we think that we are not complete. Copjec explains
that Lacan’s reading of the story of Antigone, in which he determines Antigone to be
autonomous and ethical by defying Creon in breaking the law to bury her brother,
provides a “glimpse of the difference between psychoanalysis and philosophy or
psychology,” as Lacan “does not read the behavior of each of the protagonists, he defines
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the structure through which their acts must be read.”153 It is this sort of psychoanalytic
lens that provides an avenue of inquiry into the structures that predicate the actions and
responses of Pecola, Cholly, and the other characters in The Bluest Eye.
The beginning of the novel, written in italics as the inner dialogue of Claudia, a
child who befriends Pecola, immediately references the sense of impotence that these
young girls, and the whole community feels. Claudia relates, that “there were no
marigolds in the fall of 1941,” and she and her sister Frieda “thought, at the time, that it
was because Pecola was having her father’s baby that the marigolds did not grow,” then
explaining that “A little examination and much less melancholy would have proved to us
that our seeds were not the only ones that did not sprout; nobody’s did.”154 Morrison
incites the whole community into Pecola’s hardship, while also demonstrating how these
characters feel powerless, yet are focused on their own individual lack of autonomy or
impotence, failing to recognize that the entire community is disenfranchised. Morrison
closes this opening section of Claudia’s internal dialogue with her assessment that “There
is really nothing more to say—except why. But since why is difficult to handle, one must
take refuge in how.”155 This statement of inquiry incites the framework or lens of analysis
that Copjec defines as psychoanalysis, as the structure in which actions occur, not merely
the actions themselves, are interpreted. Morrison asks the reader to inquire into “how,”
not “why,” Pecola’s tragic story unfolds as it does. Again, Morrison incites community
responsibility and an interrogation of the oppressive systems in place that foreground
what happens to Pecola. Stephanie Li claims that although it is easy to determine the
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effects of societal inequality, violence, and oppression as resulting in the “psychological
bondage” of an individual or group of people, this simplistic narrative disregards
enduring structures of social inequality.156 Rather than analyze why Pecola succumbs to
trauma and rejection, or why the community rejects her to begin with, and why her father
Cholly abuses her, it is more fruitful to look at how such events occurred, and interrogate
the environment that fosters this violence.
From the moment the reader is first introduced to Pecola, her status as an outcast
is obvious. This is only emphasized by the structure of the novel, as much of it is narrated
by a young girl named Claudia, who, along with her older sister, Frieda, befriends Pecola
when their family takes her in for a short time. Pecola’s father Cholly, an alcoholic
known for his outbursts of temper, had set fire to the Breedloves home, leaving his family
“outdoors”.157 Claudia explains that the “real terror of life” was the “outdoors,” noting
that “If you are put out, you go somewhere else; if you are outdoors, there is no place to
go. The distinction was subtle but final. Outdoors was the end of something, an
irrevocable, physical fact, defining and complementing our metaphysical condition.”158
While Claudia tells the reader that Pecola is “outdoors,” she then continues to explain
that the outdoors is “our metaphysical condition,” implicating herself and Frieda, and
perhaps the whole community, as being cast out or rejected. Claudia says that she and
Frieda enjoyed having Pecola over for that short time, making an effort to “keep her from
feeling outdoors,” particularly after they “discovered that she clearly did not want to

156

Stephanie Li, Something Akin to Freedom: The Choice of Bondage in Narratives by African American
Women, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010), 120.
157
The Bluest Eye, 17.
158
Ibid.

65

dominate us.”159 The ego-boost of being the more dominant girls around Pecola made
them accepting of her. Zizek explains that the Freudian concept of the “ideal ego,”
represents “the idealized self-image of the subject (the way I would like to be, the way I
would like others to see me).”160 It is Claudia and Frieda’s “ideal ego” that is bolstered by
being around Pecola, and though they do become friends with her, it is made clear from
the beginning that they ultimately do so for the boost in self-esteem.
The Breedloves are very dark, very poor, and have a dysfunctional family. As
such, they are the pariahs of their community in Lorain, Ohio. The family lives in an old
abandoned storefront, isolated from residential areas of town. Morrison writes that
“they lived there because they were poor and black, and they stayed there because they
believed they were ugly,” though their poverty was “traditional and stultifying,” their
ugliness was distinctive, and the community paid them no mind.161 They seem to have
accepted the position designated for them by the community as unlovable outcasts and
unworthy individuals, ignored by the world around them. Morrison writes that besides
Cholly Breedlove “whose ugliness (the result of despair, dissipation, and violence
directed towards petty things and weak people) was behavior,” the rest of the family: the
mother Pauline, and two children, Pecola and Sammy their ugliness “came from
conviction. It was as though some mysterious all-knowing master had given each one a
cloak of ugliness to wear, and they had each accepted it without question.”162 They play
the role that the oppressive white culture has placed upon them. Copjec explains that “In
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shame, unlike guilt, one experience’s one’s visibility, but there is no external Other who
sees, since shame is proof that the Other does not exist.”163 When the subject feels shame,
she no longer experiences herself as the “fulfillment of the Other’s desire,” which causes
a “distance to open up within the subject herself.”164 The Breedloves seem to accept their
ugliness as an act of shame, as they are not fulfilling the big Other’s desire—they do not
see themselves as serving a purpose in the master narrative, which throws this narrative
and any notions of a big Other or some “greater” purpose into question. Schrieber
explains that the “black trauma” of being rendered invisible or lacking value as people in
(white) dominant culture creates a “psychic struggle” to rise above this casted position
and become a self that is worthy of respect and acknowledgement.165 The Breedloves are
depicted as a group that feels shame, and has accepted their status as lesser than that is
place upon them by the community that ignores their struggles. Copjec reiterates that the
“subject is the product of history without being the fulfillment of a historical demand.”166
The Breedloves poignantly illustrate this facet of subjectivity.
Pecola understands that her color is what is keeping her from being loved and
accepted, and longs for the blue eyes of Shirley Temple, believing this will solve all of
her problems and the rejection she experiences. Morrison writes that Pecola prayed for
blue eyes every night and was “Thrown, in this way, into the binding conviction that only
a miracle could relieve her, she would never know her beauty. She would only see what
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there was to see: the eyes of other people.”167 Pecola is consumed by the belief that a
change in her external appearance will grant her a sense of wholeness and self-hood.
While it is true that much of her rejection and struggle comes from her status as a poor,
black girl, applying a Lacanian lens to this belief reveals that a change in symbolic
appearance will not grant one a sense of wholeness, as this is not possible. Sheldon
George argues that race is a “fantasy difference,” and that the plight of people of color,
and cycles of trauma in communities of color will not go away by focusing on changing
signification, one must “move beyond signification,” rather than cling to it.168 Of course,
this is nearly impossible to imagine in a world and society predicated on signification and
the Symbolic Order. Morrison writes that for Pecola, “All things in her are flux and
anticipation. But her blackness is static and dread. And it is the blackness that accounts
for, that creates, the vacuum edged with distaste in white eyes.”169 Pecola berates herself
for not being white, as if this is why she is lacking as a subject. She pities herself for not
being enough (light). Copjec explains that the subject’s superego berates her with guilt
for not living up to impossible, imaginary ideals that are imposed upon her.170 Pecola is a
character who illustrates the cruel force of the superego upon the subject, longing for blue
eyes and whiteness that she cannot possess.
Pecola wishes to embody white characteristics so badly, that she undergoes
what Lacan defines as a self-rupturing experience of excess pleasure, or jouissance when
she purchases Mary Jane candies. She notes the character of Mary Jane on the wrapper,
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with her white skin, blonde hair, and blue eyes, “blue eyes looking at her out of a world
of clean comfort.”171 To Pecola, this Mary Jane, like Shirley Temple, illustrates the
epitome of a happy, pretty, loveable girl. She treasures these candies, savoring each bite
as if “To eat the candy is somehow to eat the eyes, eat Mary Jane. Love Mary Jane. Be
Mary Jane.”172 Copjec delineates how the experience of jouissance or excess pleasure,
much like the subject’s entering into the symbolic order, is predicated by the subject’s
being internally split. She explains the Freudian notion of narcissism that is involved in
any experience of loving another or an object, stating that when we love something
external to ourselves, “what we love in the object is ourselves,” and that “in the
jouissance of loving it affords a corporeal experience of the self.”173 The Mary Jane
candies allow Pecola to access this jouissnace and experience an embodied selfhood
through a self-rupturing excess or pleasure. Morrison writes that “Three little pennies had
purchased her nine lovely orgasms with Mary Jane,” emphasizing the excessive pleasure
Pecola experiences by consuming Mary Jane.174 It also demonstrates that Pecola does see
herself in this character of Mary Jane to a degree. Sheldon George claims that “race and
racism are modes of jouissance,” and the reader can see Pecola tapping into this notion by
the jouissance she experiences while consuming the character of Mary Jane through the
candies.175 She is consuming Mary Jane’s whiteness that she so desperately desires.
The rejection of the Breedloves and specifically, Pecola by the other members of
the black community is rooted in the notion of colorism that exists in communities of
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color, in which lightness of shade is equated with higher status and beauty. Colorism is a
repetition, or internalization of an oppressive white culture. Much like Playing in the
Dark, in The Bluest Eye, Morrison is interrogating notions of race and the sort of egoboost it grants to a certain few that depend on it for a sense of self, and colorism is
another example of this phenomenon. Sheldon George writes that “race grounds fantasies
that give access to identity.”176 Colorism can be understood as another expression of the
fantasy notion of race instigated and maintained by the white community, as it is
internalized by communities of color. This is demonstrated by the character Maureen
Peal who represents a “high yellow” black girl. Everyone loves Maureen and believes her
to be good and sweet, which makes Claudia despise her and Pecola look up to her.
Claudia yells at Maureen, “you think you so cute!” to which Maureen replies to her,
Pecola, and Frieda, “I am cute! And you ugly! Black and ugly…”177 The notion of
colorism is also illustrated when a mother of a child that bullies Pecola calls her a “little
black bitch.”178 This woman teaches her son, Junior, that is a “difference between colored
people and niggers. They were easily identifiable.”179 This demonstrates how colorism is
a replication of a racist white culture that gives certain individuals of color a way to feel
more superior to the greater black community. However, one can see how this is again,
not so much a simple relationship of victim and oppression, as those that cling to this
notion seem to need it to establish a sense of self and identity. Copjec explains that
“modern man, refusing to accept the finitude that modern thought thrusts upon him,

176

Ibid., 22.
The Bluest Eye, 73.
178
Ibid., 93.
179
Ibid., 87.
177

70

doubles himself through a notion of race that allows him to survive his own death,” and it
is the avenue to immortality or eternity that race provides, this “element of ideality that is
the source of its profound violence and its disdain for every historical obstacle, every
contingency that opposes it.”180
Rejection from both the white and black community is also the source of Cholly
Breedloves own inner struggles: his self-loathing, his drinking, and his violent temper.
One cannot help but feel a sense of pity and empathy for this character, despite the fact
that he sexually abuses Pecola, his own daughter. Morrison creates a complexity in his
character that calls the reader to question “how” this inhuman abuse occurs—the cycle of
violence and series of violent events that precede and follow the abuse—and not
necessarily “why” it does, as she suggests in the novel’s beginning. It is stated throughout
the novel that Cholly’s abusive treatment of his family and his anger are forms of selfprotection so that he does not have to face the extent of his own trauma. This is why
Morrison writes that despite the fact that Cholly hates his wife and that the two of them
get into physical altercations frequently, he still needs her. Morrison writes that Mrs.
Breedlove was “one of the few things abhorrent to him that he could touch and therefore
hurt. He poured out on her the sum of all his inarticulate fury and aborted desire. Hating
her, he could leave himself intact.”181 Cholly cannot do hurt the society that hurts him,
but he can hurt his wife, and therefore directs his fury toward someone that is within his
reach. Copjec clarifies that the subject’s fantasmatic sense of reality, his or her “Psychical
reality can indefinitely defer, and thus replace, the reality of brute fact,” concluding that
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this means that “it would be impossible to assume from the objective facts alone, how, or
even that, the victims suffered as a consequence of their situations,” as there are a variety
of psychic processes that function to protect the subject from pain.182 Cholly acts out in
an attempt to protect himself from his own trauma, though like every other character in
the novel, it would be too simplistic to label him as a merely a victim of trauma.
Just before the scene where Cholly rapes Pecola, Morrison tells the reader of a
past traumatizing event that has shaped Cholly into the person he becomes, an event
defined by racial and sexual violence. Morrison tells the story of Cholly’s first sexual
experience when he was young that involved a consensual act that becomes one was he
forced to do. This scene has been noted by scholars to be a rape scene, both
foreshadowing and paralleling his rape of Pecola. During this scene, Cholly and his
partner, Darlene, are outside engaging in intercourse when two white men with weapons,
a spirit lamp, and a flashlight happen upon them. The men point their lights Cholly and
Darlene’s direction and laugh, telling Cholly, “Get on wid it nigger,” Cholly replies,
“Sir?,” and the one with the flashlight repeats, “I said, get on wid it. An’ make it good,
nigger, make it good.”183 Darlene covers her face in horror, while Cholly “began to
simulate what had gone on before,” while the men cajoled him, “Come on, coon. Faster.
You ain’t doing nothing for her,” and snicker.184 Morrison writes that in moment, Cholly
hated Darlene and wanted to hurt her. The omniscient narrator explains that Cholly’s
“subconscious knew what his conscious mind did not guess—that hating them [the white
men] would have consumed him…For now, he hated the one who had created the
182
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situation, the one who bore witness to his failure, his impotence.”185 Cholly feels
powerless to these white men and the greater racist culture, and instead, directs his hate at
someone within his reach. Ashraf H.A. Rushdy explains that many of Morrison’s novels
are constructed through traumatic scenes such as this, defining them as “primal scenes,”
that are of “such significance that an individual would recollect that episode, and not
another, at the crucial moment driven to reevaluate her or his life.”186 This traumatic
scene must be recalled by Cholly, must be registered, and dealt with, but he pushes this
memory away, just before he rapes Pecola. Rushdy relates that “Morrison has artfully
delineated the pain and necessity of remembering primal scenes in each of her novels.”187
Rather than deal with his own trauma as it resurfaces, Cholly sexually abuses his
daughter. Morrison writes that Cholly was “alone with his perceptions and appetites, and
only they interested him.”188 The omniscient narrator continues to explain that Cholly did
not have stable model of a family while he was young, and did not know how feel
fatherly towards his children, “As it was, he reacted to them, and his reactions were based
on what he felt at the moment.”189 When Cholly came upon Pecola alone in the kitchen
washing dishes, “The sequence of his emotions were revulsion, guilt, pity, then love,”
feeling disgusted and angry with how weak and defeated she looked.190 Pecola then
scratched her calf with her other foot, which reminded him of when her mother, Pauline
used to do that when we first met her. Morrison writes that in that moment, “The
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confused mixture of his memories of Pauline and the doing of a wild and forbidden thing
excited him.”191 This scene is written rather graphically, going into detail with the bodily
pleasure that Cholly experienced. Morrison writes that “His soul seemed to slip down to
his guts and fly out into her…”192 Cholly acts impulsively to satisfy his own desires
rather than confront the sexual and racial trauma he himself has experienced. Copjec
explains the futility of desire that consumes the subject who is “finite,” and will never be
satisfied, “One thing comes to be substituted for another in an endless chain only because
the subject is cut off from that essential thing that would complete it.”193 Schreiber
explains that Cholly’s “rape of Pecola reenacts his own ‘rape,’ in his first sexual
experience. Pecola literally absorbs his sexual trauma.”194 In pursuit of his own desire,
Cholly continues the cycle of trauma and violence.
What is almost more heartbreaking and difficult to read than the rape scene itself
is the reaction of the town when everyone finds out that Cholly impregnated Pecola and
has taken off. A group of women gossiping discuss the event, saying, “None of them
Breedloves are right anyhow,” that Pecola carries some of the blame for what happened
to her, and she would be lucky if the child did not live, saying it’s “Bound to be the
ugliest thing walking.”195 Even Claudia and Frieda abandon Pecola, though they felt very
sad for her, Claudia noting that nobody else seemed to share their sorrow for Pecola,
instead, people were “amused” or “shocked”.196 Pecola descends into madness, talks to
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herself in a schizophrenic manner, believing she now has a “friend,” hallucinates, seeing
herself with the blue eyes she has prayed for, and her baby dies. J.E. Riley et al. relates
that “Morrison’s novel chooses not to place blame on any one individual; instead, the
novel, in telling each character’s experiences and struggles with racism, encourages
readers to empathize with their plights,” while also calling on to communities to “take
care of their own, to protect one another against the ravages of cultural illnesses such as
racism.”197 Rather than protect their own, this community seems to use the Breedloves as
a pedestal to raise themselves up, and to make them feel better about their own lives and
circumstances. Claudia recounts her and Frieda’s relationship with Pecola saying, “We
were so beautiful when we stood astride her ugliness. Her simplicity decorated us, her
guilt sanctified us, her pain made us glow with health…”198 Pecola becomes the vessel
for the community’s own sense of lack and trauma.
Cathy Caruth explains that “it is the experience of waking into consciousness that,
peculiarly, is identified with relieving trauma,” though waking up out of one’s fantasy
reality is also a traumatic experience.199 Rather than individually face the rupture at the
heart of being, and share their own experiences of trauma, the community depicted in The
Bluest Eye chooses to instead cling to their own fantasy of reality for selfhood, and uses
Pecola and the Breedloves to unload their own experiences of racial trauma and sense of
lack. Claudia explains that she and Frieda, and the whole community, failed Pecola by
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using her to feel more valuable or whole, instead of caring for her as their own.200
Claudia also reflects on their barren flower bed as she did at the story’s opening. Copjec
explains that love is a self-rupturing experience in which the subject shatters the ego, and
gains access to a sense of selfhood. She explains that the object or individual itself is
made lovable by the very act of loving it, stating that “love is that which renders what the
other is loveable.”201 It is this sort of act that is needed to relieve trauma, as Caruth
claims. This is not to say that the problems in this community could have been solved by
overcoming psychical obstacles—the greater society that propagates the racism this
community endures and reproduces will still exist regardless of such self-reflection.
However, the oppressive white culture around them is also predicated on the sense of
lack and ruptured sense of self that Copjec delineates, which provides a glimpse into how
such social structures exist. Claudia explains that looking back on her childhood and the
story of Pecola, “I even think now that the land of the entire country was hostile to
marigolds that year.”202 As Morrison tells the reader at the beginning of the novel, it is
more productive to think critically about how such violence, oppression, and trauma
occurs, rather than ponder why, if a community is to foster an environment in which
marigolds can grow.
The Ruptured Subject, Lacanian Ethics, and the Story of Antigone: An Analysis of Sethe
in Beloved
In Beloved, the protagonist Sethe also faces personal violence and trauma, though
she can be interpreted as a character that is able to make a decision outside of the
200
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fantasmatic realm of subjectivity and reality when she kills her baby to protect her from a
life of slavery. In completing research for The Black Book in the early 1970’s, Morrison
happened upon a newspaper clipping from 1865 that detailed a slave mother who killed
her children, without remorse, to spare them the suffering she had experienced under
slavery, and it is this historical narrative that serves as the basis for Sethe in Beloved.203
Such an autonomous and self-defining action is a notion that Copjec analyzes through
Lacan’s reading of the story of Antigone. Much of the critical scholarship of this novel,
perhaps Morrison’s most widely read and studied work of fiction, does employ a
Lacanian lens to analyze the character of Sethe in terms of her subjectivity and the fierce
love she has for her children. However, much of this scholarship focuses on Sethe’s
shortcomings as a subject, due to the trauma she experiences as a slave that she actively
represses. Rather than analyze this aspect of Sethe’s character and the other protagonists,
which has already been done thoroughly in scholarship about this novel, I will analyze
Sethe’s singular act of killing her baby as a form of protection. I propose an alternative
reading of Sethe with a different focus, one rooted in Copjec’s specific Lacanian analysis
of subjectivity, sublimation, and ethics in Imagine There’s No Woman. Specifically, I
would like to analyze Sethe’s act of killing her child as a way to protect her. By first
exploring Copjec’s interrogation of Lacanian ethics based on the psychoanalytic concepts
of desire and the death-drive, and detailing her analysis of Lacan’s reading of Antigone
as an ethical subject, it will be possible to also understand Sethe’s act as at once selfrupturing and ethical.
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Copjec grounds her work on Lacan’s notions ethics, in which he opposes
traditional philosophical understandings of ethics and being. For Lacan, the ability to
ethically position oneself in relation to another is only possible through acknowledging
the Law of Desire as the motivational force that causes every individual to act in order to
fulfill desires that are impossible to satisfy. The “lack” that is felt by every individual can
never be contented, as it is a psychically constructed feeling of a loss of self that one
experiences upon entering the Symbolic Order, thought, and language. For Lacan, one
must realize the limit of desire and learn to make choices in light of the realization that
what is desired can never be obtained. Slavoj Žižek states that the “ultimate ethical task
of the subject is that of the true awakening: not only from sleep, but from the spell of
fantasy that controls us even more when we are awake.”204 Copjec explains that “the
ethics of psychoanalysis is concerned not with the other, as is the case with so much of
the contemporary work on ethics, but rather with the subject, who metamorphoses herself
at the moment of encounter with the real of an unexpected event.”205 The ethical act, free
of ideology and personal interest, is a traumatic, self-rupturing choice in which the
subject ceases to be a subject of desire and becomes a subject of the drive. Schrieber
connects this notion to that of “Lacan’s subject of knowledge who can move past
culture’s gaze to create a life based on personal, rather than cultural, desire.”206 The
ethical act takes place outside of ideology or any cultural or societal script.
Copjec explains the concept of the death drive to demonstrate how an ethical act
from personal interest or ideology, is rooted in the drive, not desire—which is really the
204
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Other’s desire, or desire that is dictated to the subject from her particular historical
moment and the greater society in which she lives. Unlike desire, the drive’s goal is not
satisfaction, and is not looking for the next outward thing so much as it is reverting back
to the primordial state of satisfaction the subject experiences before entering the
Symbolic Order. Copjec clarifies that “Directed not outward toward the constituted
world, but away from it, the death drive aims at the past, at a time before the subject
found itself where it is now, imbedded in time and moving toward death.”207 This
primordial state is “mythical,” and re-written in psychoanalysis as the “primordial
mother-child dyad which supposedly contained all things and every happiness to which
the subject strives throughout his life to return.”208 This primordial state can never be
achieved, though in reverting back to this state before the subject enters the symbolic
order and the world of language, which cuts the subject from herself and the real, the
drive is associated with the real, while desire is rooted in the symbolic order. This is the
key difference between the desire and the drive: while one is predicated on the external
world that dictates one’s desires, in which the subject moves from one object to the next,
the drive is predicated by the real, and grants the subject access to a self-rupturing
experience of jouissance, raising the subject out of her historical contingency. Zizek
explains that “the consistency to which Lacan’s position hinges is thus the difference
between reality and the Real.”209 Ethics must be rooted in the real, not in the subject’s
fantasy of reality, or the symbolic order, thus, the ethical subject is a subject of drive, not
desire.
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Sublimation is a process that operates in conjunction with the drive, and Copjec
argues that this process is the key to understanding Antigone’s ability to love her brother
above all else, and perform an ethical act. Copjec explains that “the death drive achieves
its satisfaction by not achieving its aim,” as the “proper and positive activity of the drive
is to inhibit the attainment of its aim, or in other words, it is “sublimated.”210 When the
subject desires an object, in actuality, she desires the satisfaction the object is perceived
to provide, not the object itself—any object will do, and the subject moves from one to
the next, never fully satisfied. However, sublimation is a different process entirely that is
rooted in the drive, in the real, not in the symbolic order. Copjec explains that “The point
is that the drive does not aim beyond the ordinary object at the satisfaction to be attained
on the other or thither side of it.”211 She continues to explain that the object the subject
selects through the act of sublimation as part of the drive “is not a means to something
other than itself, but is itself other than itself.”212 The subject invests the object with some
surplus value that is not articulable through the language of the symbolic. It is the drive
that chooses the object and divides it so that it is not what it actually is. Copjec writes that
“There could not be a better description of drive/sublimation: it so wills what occurs that
the object it finds is indistinguishable from the one it chooses.”213 The act of sublimation
is the act of elevating an object to the status of a loved thing. The drive and the objects it
selects are particular to each person, and are not rooted in ideology or the external
world—it is a process invoking the real, not fantasy reality. This is why the drive and
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sublimation are the key in providing an avenue for the subject to act free of historical
contingency, ideology, or some cultural or societal script—to complete a truly
autonomous act.
Lacan identifies an ethical act as a matter of personal self-rupturing, in which one
makes a choice in a particular situation where there is no apparent choice to be made. It is
for this reason that Lacan’s reading of the story of Antigone functions to represent her act
of breaking the law of the state to bury her dead brother as an ethical act. As the story
goes, Antigone tries to attain an honorable burial for her brother Polyneices, though
Creon, the ruler, of Thebes, forbids this burial, as Polyneices is a traitor to Thebes. The
punishment for providing a proper burial for her brother would result in her being locked
in a tomb to die. Copjec writes that “the deed Antigone undertakes traces the path of the
criminal drive, away from the possibilities the community prescribes and toward the
impossible real.”214 Through Antigone’s love for her brother, she is able to perform a
transgressive act that separates herself from the conditional characteristics of her identity
and place in history, as well as her social community, while also exposing the void of the
real from which the symbolic structure is predicated. Copjec explains that Antigone’s act
is ethical in that she removes herself from the economy of desire and becomes a subject
of the drive, due to how she “gives herself her own law and does not seek validation from
any other authority.”215 In separating herself from the conditional basis of her identity,
defying the ruler Creon, and asserting her love for her brother above all other
considerations, Antigone becomes autonomous in making a decision that is not given to
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her, constructing a different outcome for herself, and also forcing Creon to question his
own desire and make a decision as well.
This is when the process of sublimation and its connection to ethics becomes
apparent: though Antigone’s “love for her brother does not depend on any of his
qualities, Antigone is not indifferent to them; she accepts them lovingly,” as “love is that
which renders what the other is loveable.”216 Antigone elevates her brother to the status
of a loved thing through the process of sublimation, is able to make a decision in which
she sacrifices everything in order to declare her love for her brother, and guarantee his
honorable burial. Antigone follows Lacan’s ethical command: “Do not give way to your
desire,” by pushing beyond the limit of her desire, by risking her life to bury the brother
she loves.217 Copjec reiterates that though the ethical act is never selfless, there is a clear
difference between the perseverance of the ethical imperative and acting for personal
gain. The contrast between Antigone in clinging to her desire, and Creon who holds fast
to the laws of the state demonstrates the “difference between ‘acting in conformity with
the real of desire’ and acting in a self-interested way, or acting to preserve one’s own
continuity with oneself.”218 While Creon could receive validation or praise from others
for following the law, and therefore has something to gain from doing so, Antigone does
not have anything to gain from her decision, and in fact, stands to lose everything.
Through the act of burying her brother, Antigone can no longer continue as she was
before and sacrifices her symbolic life or identity, and place in her community, along
with her biological death. Copjec claims that when “she covers the exposed body of her
216
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brother, Antigone raises herself out of the conditions of naked existence to which Creon
remains bound.”219 Antigone carries out an autonomous act, free of ideological basis,
while Creon cannot break from the law and is bound to it.
In the same way that Antigone follows Lacan’s ethical command, “Do not give
way on your desire,” so too can Sethe’s choice be seen to follow this subjective
understanding. Copjec explains that “the ethics of psychoanalysis is not concerned with
the other,” but is instead “a matter of personal conversion, of the subjective necessity of
going beyond oneself.”220 This is why the ethical act is never a selfless act, as in the case
of Antigone, where she did not seek validation for her action from anyone beside herself.
Sethe explains to Paul D, an old friend of hers from “Sweet Home,” the plantation in
which they were both enslaved, how she made the independent decision to take her
children and run away alone. She reiterates, “It was a kind of selfishness I never knew
nothing about before. It felt good. Good and right.”221 Sethe knew that the only way she
would be free to love her children would be to leave the life of slavery that prohibited
slave women from caring for and bonding with their children. Morrison writes that Paul
D “knew exactly what she [Sethe] meant: to get to a place where you could love anything
you choose—not to need permission for desire—well now, that was freedom.”222 Sethe’s
decision to risk her life and those of her children to run away, and the act of killing her
baby when she was confronted with the possibility of their return to the plantation,
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demonstrates the kind of autonomous perseverance of following her own desire against
all other imperatives that Lacan defines as fundamental to the ethical act.
Copjec reiterates that though the ethical act is never selfless, there is a clear
difference between the perseverance of the ethical imperative and acting for personal
gain. The contrast between Antigone in clinging to her desire, and Creon who holds fast
to the laws of the state demonstrates the “difference between ‘acting in conformity with
the real of desire’ and acting in a self-interested way, or acting to preserve one’s own
continuity with oneself.”223 While Creon could receive validation or praise from others
for following the law, and therefore has something to gain from doing so, Antigone does
not have anything to gain from her decision, and in fact, stands to lose everything.
Through the act of burying her brother, Antigone can no longer continue as she was
before and sacrifices her symbolic life or identity, and place in her community, along
with her biological death. This is an example of the sort of self-rupturing that occurs in
the ethical act, one that Sethe’s actions also demonstrate. Morrison states that when faced
with the possibility of her children’s return to slavery, Sethe took “every bit of life she
had made, all the parts of her that were precious and fine and beautiful, and carried,
pushed, dragged them through the veil, out, away, over there where no one could hurt
them.”224 If Sethe had acted in a self-interested manner, as Copjec defines as acting to
“preserve one’s continuity with oneself,” she would not have chosen to kill her children
to spare them a lifetime of slavery, as in doing so, she is sacrificing her symbolic identity
as a mother. George explains that “slavery is a blow to the slave’s fantasy of being,”
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therefore, Sethe’s past exerpeinces in slavery have obliterated any fantastical sense of
complete being or identity, leading her to be able to make such a self-rupturing decision
in sacrificing her child, reaching the limit of her desire and becoming a subject of
drive.225 In this way, Sethe stands to lose everything through her decision, to lose “all of
the parts of her that were precious and fine and beautiful,” namely, her children and her
identity as a mother. Morrison writes that “more than what Sethe did was what she
claimed,” which scared Paul D who responded to Sethe’s story by telling her, “Your love
is too thick.”226 Sethe responds, “Love is or it ain’t. Thin love ain’t love at all.”227 Sethe’s
insistence on reaching the limit of her desire and sacrificing all she has in this pursuit,
demonstrates the autonomous ethical imperative that Lacan uses the story of Antigone to
illustrate.
Conclusion
The Bluest Eye and Beloved both engage with the psychoanalytic notion of a
subject of lack that Copjec outlines. In The Bluest Eye, Pecola, as well as the other
characters, struggle with establishing a sense of self outside of the oppressive greater
white culture, or master narrative. Pecola clings to the notion that if she appeared more
“white,” the sense of lack and rejection she feels will be absolved. By the same token,
Cholly mistreats others to repress his own sense of lack, and trauma he has yet to
confront. Praying for blue eyes, and believing she has gained them by the story’s end,
Pecola demonstrates how she strives for recognition in the symbolic, unable to perceive a
different way of being. Claudia Leeb explains that “a politics of recognition, rather than
225

Sheldon George, Trauma and Race: A Lacanian study of African American Racial Identity, 19.
Ibid., 193.
227
Ibid., 194.
226

85

establishing more equal societies, makes it more difficult to understand and combat
injustice in social and political relations.”228 However, it is not fair to delineate Pecola
and Cholly as characters that carry grave psychological issues without first inciting the
greater culture that is to blame for the violence, trauma, and oppression illustrated in the
novel that they each suffer through. In Beloved, Sethe is able to reach the limit of her
desire, rise above her historical contingency and fantasy sense of self and identity in
transgressing all law, killing her child to save her from the life of slavery she has
endured. Reading Sethe in light of Lacan’s reading of Antigone that Copjec employs for
her analyses of sublimation and ethics, it is possible to offer a new reading of Sethe, as a
character that is able to become a subject of drive, and make a completely autonomous
decision. Copjec’s specific Lacanian lens and theorizing of the subject of lack is most
beneficial to a reading of these two novels, while the novels themselves are able to
provide potent illustrations for such complex theories of subjectivity and being.
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CONCLUSION
The definitive goal of this thesis is to explicate how the work of Agamben and
Copjec provide potent frameworks of analyses in which to interrogate Morrison’s work,
and demonstrate how Morrison’s work expands upon or provides explicit illustrations of
Agamben’s theories of biopolitics and Copjec’s psychoanalytic subject of lack. Placing
these there writers in dialogue with each other offers an avenue to rethink certain
concepts of race, racism, and subjectivity. Throughout the process of writing this thesis, I
have formed other questions that concern the similarities, or points of reference that
philosophy and literature share. While it has often been written that Morrison’s work
offers complex and powerful material for analyses using a number of critical and
theoretical frameworks, I am now convinced that Morrison’s work offers material with
which to better understand and perceive complex theoretical concepts, and the questions
that are most often explored in the field of critical theory. Her work asks many of the
same questions, and attempts to delineate them in much the same way as critical theorists
such as Agamben and Copjec do, but as a novelist and artist, she simply uses different
tools to conduct these quests into some of the most difficult questions concerning
violence, oppression, and self-hood. In “Rootedness: The Ancestor as Foundation,” an
article written by Morrison in 1984, she states her belief that literature “should be
beautiful, and powerful, but it should also work. It should have something in it that
enlightens; something in it that opens the door and points the way.”229 Her novels are an
attempt to work through difficult questions of injustice and subjectivity, race and racism,
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using art rather than abstract theoretical language in the manner of philosophers and
critical theorists.
Morrison reiterates, however, that literature should have “Something in it that
suggests what the conflicts are, what the problems are. But it need not solve those
problems because it is not a case study, it is not a recipe.”230 Morrison’s novels reflect
this belief, as her work attempts to analyze the “how” of violence and subjectivity in
oppressive societal structures, though she does not attempt to provide instruction as to
what the exact method of solving such issues are. She does, however, hint at notions of
love, community, and collective healing that she views as detrimental to overcoming such
conflict. Writers such as Agamben and Copjec demonstrate a similar practice, as they
each delineate systems of injustice and division, though in abstract, theoretical
terminology. Though they conceptualize different ways of being, they do not provide a
script for solving the complex issues they interrogate so much as they offer hints or
“point the way,” as Morrison claims all literature should do. The similar projects and
intellectual practice of writing novels and writing philosophy should be more deeply
studied, rather than posing critical theory as merely a framework to analyze literature in
literary studies, or using literature as an illustration of certain philosophies and theories.
Morrison’s fiction provides convincing impetus to study the two disciplines of
philosophy or critical theory and literature in conjunction, to further explore their
similarities and intellectual projects as writings with related purpose.
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